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Introduction
On April 3, 1936, Bruno Richard Hauptmann was executed in
Trenton, New Jersey, for kidnapping and murdering the Lindbergh
baby. The most dramatic moment in the trial came when Charles
Lindbergh identified Hauptmann's voice as that of his baby's
kidnapper. Three years earlier, still hoping to get his son back alive,
Lindbergh had accompanied Dr. John Condon to St. Raymond's
cemetery in the Bronx. Condon had gone there to deliver ransom
money to the kidnapper, while Lindbergh waited some seventy to one
hundred yards away in the car.' Out of the darkness came the words,
"Hey, doktor! Over here, over here," pronounced with a foreign
accent.2 Twenty-nine months after the encounter in the cemetery, in
September 1934, Lindbergh told a Bronx grand jury that "[i]t would
be very difficult to sit here and say that I could pick a man by that
voice."3 Nonetheless, the district attorney asked Lindbergh later that
day: "Would you like to see the man who kidnapped your son?"4
The next morning, while Lindbergh sat in the back of the D.A.'s
office among a group of detectives, Hauptmann was brought in and
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asked to repeat the words, "Hey, doctor. Here, doctor, over here."5
Lindbergh told the prosecutor that he recognized Hauptmann's voice
as that of the kidnapper.6
At trial, Lindbergh recounted the events at the cemetery.7 He
then testified:
Q. Whose voice was it, Colonel, that you heard in the vicinity of St.
Raymond's Cemetery that night, saying, "Hey, Doctor?"
A. That was Hauptmann's voice.
Q. You heard it again the second time where?
A. At District Attorney Foley's office in New York, in the Bronx.8
Lindbergh's lawyer commented: "The minute Lindbergh
'pointed his finger' at Hauptmann, the trial was over. 'Jesus Christ'
himself said he was convinced this was the man who killed his son.
Who was anybody to doubt him or deny him justice?"9
Sixty-five years later, Hauptmann's conviction and execution
remain controversial. Was he truly guilty of the kidnapping, or was
he wrongly convicted, perhaps in part because of the anti-German
sentiment then prevalent in the United States? We will not attempt
to answer the ultimate question of Hauptmann's guilt or innocence.
But we will address others that the Lindbergh case raised: Are
people really able to remember a voice that they have only heard
once? Are three syllables enough of a sample? Isn't twenty-nine
months a long time? Does the stress of the situation make memory
better or worse? What effect does a foreign accent have on our
ability to identify voices?
Hauptmann's attorney was in no position to present expert
evidence on any of these questions. There was no relevant expertise
at that time. But the case did trigger experimentation by
psychologists into the question of how good we are at identifying
voices."0 Since then we have learned a great deal more. Nonetheless,
the law has virtually stood still since Hauptmann's execution.
Generally, people who believe they recognize a voice are simply
5. Id. at 249.
6. Id. at 249-50.
7. In his testimony, Lindbergh left out the words, "over here." Transcript at 109,
State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935) (No. 99). In fact, there is dispute over what
the kidnapper actually said. Lindbergh had apparently told the grand jury that the words
were, "Hey, doc," KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 209. Others quote the kidnapper as having
said, "Hey, Doctor! Hey, Doctor, over here." GEORGE WALLER, KIDNAP: THE STORY
OF THE LINDBERGH CASE 75 (1961). We thank Ronelle Delmont for providing us with a
compact disk containing the transcript.
8. Transcript at 113-14, Hauptmann (No. 99).
9. A. Scorr BERG, LINDBERGH 315 (1998).
10. This is literally true. See Frances McGehee, The Reliability of the Identification of
the Human Voice, 17 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 249 (1937), discussed infra note 169.
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allowed to take the stand and say so. As we will see, the American
legal system is all too often wrong in its assumptions about people's
ability to recognize voices. Other countries fare no better. In 1995, a
Canadian appellate court exonerated Guy Paul Morin, whose
conviction three years earlier of raping and murdering a young girl
was largely based on an inaccurate identification of his voice." Post-
conviction DNA testing excluded him as the perpetrator.12
Many of the problems that people have identifying speakers
from their voices are similar to those that people have as
eyewitnesses. The amount of exposure, the nature of the
identification process, and the number of exposures all matter in
determining how likely a witness is to be correct. 3 Yet while the
reliability of eyewitness identification has been a focal point in the
news, the scholarly literature, and the courts," the unreliability of
earwitness identification has gone virtually unnoticed in the case law
and legal literature. The reluctance of the legal system to deal with
this problem stems from a confluence of ignorance, rigid adherence to
historical positions that are no longer tenable, and some interesting
judicial missteps concerning the accuracy of "voiceprints" that have
made courts unreceptive to voice identification research.
Part I of this Article examines the foundation required for a
voice identification to be admissible. The Supreme Court has held
that a party offering eyewitness identification made under suggestive
circumstances must demonstrate indicia of reliability to comply with
due process standards.'5 While courts sometimes apply these same
standards to earwitness identification cases, they often fail to give
earwitness testimony even that much scrutiny, basing their decisions
on the rules of evidence governing authentication, which require very
11. See Regina v. Morin, 37 C.R. (4th) 395 (Ontario Ct. App. 1995). The voice
identification aspect of the case is discussed in A. Daniel Yarmey, A. Linda Yarmey,
Meagan J. Yarmey & Lisa Parliament, Commonsense Beliefs and the Identification of
Familiar Voices, 15 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 283 (2001).
12. Morin, 37 C.R. (4th) 395.
13. There is extensive literature on problems with eyewitness testimony. For a
collection of articles that provide a good introduction to some of the research in this area,
see EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells &
Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984). See also BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD,
MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (1995).
One study has compared people's ability to identify a target whom they had both seen and
heard for fifteen seconds, five minutes before the test. A. Daniel Yarmey, A. Linda
Yarmey & Meagan J. Yarmey, Face and Voice Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 8
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 453 (1994). The result was that people were more
accurate in visual identification than they were identifying the individual by voice. Id.
14. For example, New York has recently joined the growing number of states that
permit expert evidence by defendants to point out potentially unreliable aspects of
eyewitness testimony. See People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 2001).
15. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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little foundation.1 6 We will argue that some of the cases require so
little evidence of reliability that they are unconstitutional even under
current standards. We will also point out serious risks of
misidentification that call for some adjustment in the legal rules.
In Part II we summarize some of the empirical research
regarding the reliability of voice identification, research that the legal
system has by and large ignored. This omission is significant. For one
thing, if reliability is the basis for constitutional analysis of suggestive
identifications, knowing what makes an identification more or less
reliable is a prerequisite for intelligent inquiry. Moreover, in
establishing such a low threshold for admissibility the system leaves
judgments of reliability to the jury. But unless information is
presented to jurors through other actors in the legal system, whether
through cross-examination, the introduction of expert testimony, or
informative jury instructions, jurors will have no reasonable basis for
making this judgment.
We discuss a number of factors that have an impact on reliability.
Some people are good at identifying voices-others are terrible at it.
Memory for voices stays with us for a few weeks, but then degrades if
not reinforced. Longer exposures produce better recollection-up to
a point. Repeated exposure helps a great deal. People have trouble
recognizing voices that they earlier heard with a different tone of
voice. People between the ages of sixteen and forty are best at
recognizing voices. People are better at remembering voices that they
heard live rather than on tape or over the telephone. People are
generally bad at recognizing the voices of those speaking foreign
languages and are not very good at recognizing the voices of those
speaking their own language with a foreign accent.
Part III considers the possible role of experts in speaker
identification cases. The legal system's excessive confidence in voice
identification technology in the 1960s and 1970s has made the system
especially suspicious of experts even several decades later. Courts
had placed increasing hope on the ability of machines, called sound
spectrographs, to create "voiceprints" unique to each speaker.
Earlier, voiceprint analysis had been rejected by courts as unreliable.
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 came a
softening in judicial resistance. At about the same time, certain
prominent phoneticians who had opposed the use of sound
spectrography in courts began to support it as the technology
improved. Some, but not all courts, began to permit voice
comparisons by spectrographic experts. Then, in 1979, the National
Academy of Science issued an influential report, arguing that there is
insufficient evidence that spectrographic analysis is reliable enough
16. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(5).
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for forensic application.17  The result was abandonment of
spectrographic analysis in court proceedings in most jurisdictions,
even those whose courts had approved it just a few years earlier.
Nonetheless, a few courts, relying on a superficial understanding of
this history, continue to allow it. The Supreme Court of Alaska has
only recently permitted its use for the first time."
Unfortunately, this focus on spectrographic analysis has
deflected serious inquiry into how good ordinary people are at
identifying speakers from their voices and whether experts are any
better than untrained people. A great deal has been written on these
issues, especially in the past ten years, but almost none of it has made
its way into American legal discourse, which associates questions of
speaker identification with the voiceprint issue. To be fair, much of
the basic research has been conducted outside the United States and
is not readily accessible to those who do not know where to look. But
it is now time for the system to consider this information and to put it
to appropriate use.
As for what experts can do, there is still debate. But experts are
at least somewhat better than lay people at comparing voice samples
aurally, which may be especially significant in cases requiring
comparison of a voice on a tape recording to that of a witness or the
defendant. Although courts have been divided on the matter since
the Supreme Court's 1993 Dauber' decision, we do not recommend
that the system accept the testimony of those who hold themselves
out as voiceprint experts. However, when used in limited
circumstances by experts in phonetics, spectrographic information can
sometimes augment aural voice analysis in ways that can be helpful to
the legal system. Moreover, experts can bring the weaknesses of lay
identification to the attention of judges and juries. Courts have long
recognized that identification of a person by voice alone presents
"grave dangers of prejudice to the suspect. ', 20
Finally, in Part IV, the Article concludes with a number of
suggestions for improving the legal system's handling of voice
identification. Among our recommendations are the adoption of
non-suggestive identification procedures, the use of reliability criteria
in tune with the scientific research, the admission of expert testimony
to bring to the jury's attention aspects of an identification that reduce
its reliability, and informative jury instructions.
17. COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, ASSEMBLY OF
BEHAVIORAL AND SOC. SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION (1979).
18. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 400-02 (Alaska 1999).
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
20. Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1966).
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I. Legal Standards for Identifying Speakers
Lindbergh's identification of Hauptmann could not have been
more suggestive. Having just sworn to a grand jury that he would not
likely be able to identify the kidnapper's voice, in a one-on-one
encounter Lindbergh was presented with an individual whom the
D.A. said was the person who killed Lindbergh's son. That person
was Hauptmann. Lindbergh indeed identified Hauptmann's voice
and testified at trial that he had done so. Since the Hauptmann trial,
the basic evidentiary principle has remained the same: Someone who
heard a speaker's voice can take the witness stand and identify that
voice, subject to the opposing party's right to cross-examine.
However, during the past three decades, the Supreme Court has
held that due process considerations require inquiry into the
reliability of an identification when it is found to be suggestive. In
Section A, we look at the application of these requirements in
earwitness identification cases. In Section B, we examine a set of
cases in which the voice being identified is on tape. In those cases,
courts apply rules governing authentication and require only minimal
familiarity with a voice for an identification to stand. As we will see,
courts sometimes pay too little attention to suggestiveness and
reliability issues in tape cases and occasionally even apply the
minimal standards of tape cases to live identifications.
A. Due Process Requirements
(1) The Biggers Criteria
The seminal case in both eyewitness and earwitness identification
is Neil v. Biggers, decided by the Supreme Court in 1972.2' That case
involved a crime victim's identification of the defendant at a
"showup"-a procedure in which the police march the suspect in
front of the victim and ask for identification, without the safeguard of
requiring the victim to choose the defendant from among a group of
people in a lineup. Approximately seven months after the crime
occurred, officers showed the defendant to a rape victim at a police
station, where she had an opportunity to look him over and hear him
utter the words "shut up or I'll kill you. 22 Based on his appearance
and voice, she testified at trial that she had "no doubt" that the
defendant was her assailant.
23
The Court concentrated on the eyewitness aspect of the
identification, and established a framework for evaluating claims that
21. 409 U.S. 188.
22. Id. at 195.
23. Id.
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a defendant's right to due process was violated by a suggestive
identification procedure.4 The focus should be on the risk of a false
identification:
It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's
right to due process.... Suggestive confrontations are disapproved
because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and
unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason
that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous. But as
Stovall makes clear, the admission of evidence of a showup without
more does not violate due process."
The Court then articulated criteria for evaluating the likelihood
of misidentification:
We turn, then, to the central question, whether under the "totality
of the circumstances" the identification was reliable even though
the confrontation procedure was suggestive. As indicated by our
cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of
misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention,
the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.26
Using these criteria, the Court held that the rape victim's
identification of the defendant as her assailant was good enough to
pass muster.27  It noted that the defendant's appearance was
consistent with a description she had given police shortly after the
crime occurred. Moreover, she had previously been shown several
other suspects and had failed to single out any one of them as the
rapist. 9 The Court was also impressed with her level of confidence in
the identification.0
In a subsequent case, Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court
elaborated on the decision in Biggers." It held that "the corrupting
effect" of suggestive procedures must be balanced against indicia of
reliability, which is "the linchpin in determining the admissibility of
identification testimony., 32 If the identification is reliable, then it
24. Id. at 198.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 199-200. How much influence the Biggers criteria have on jurors is not
entirely clear. For a study showing that jurors appear to care about the interaction
between attention and certainty in evaluating eyewitness testimony, see Amy J. Bradfield
& Gary L. Wells, The Perceived Validity of Eyewitness Identification Testimony: A Test of
the Five Biggers Criteria, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 581 (2000).
27. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200-01.
28. Id. at 200.
29. Id. at 201.
30. Id. at 200-01.
31. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
32. Id. at 114.
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should be allowed notwithstanding improperly suggestive
procedures.33 This creates a two-step analysis in cases of this sort.
First, a court should ask whether the identification was suggestive,
and second, if it was suggestive, whether it was nonetheless reliable
under the criteria set forth in Biggers.
Although Biggers and Manson both concentrated on eyewitness
identification, it is worth bearing in mind that the victim in Biggers
was exposed not only to the defendant's appearance, but also to his
voice. There is no reason for courts to limit the holdings of these
cases to eyewitness identification, and they do not. As we will see
below, some courts have applied Biggers and Manson to voice
identification, and no court has said that the two-step analysis should
not apply when auditory identification is in issue. Thus, Biggers and
Manson set the constitutional standard for admitting voice
identification evidence in earwitness cases.
(2) Due Process Analysis in Voice Identification Cases
The initial question in a Biggers/Manson analysis is whether
voice identification procedures were overly suggestive. If the
procedure is held not to have been suggestive, courts generally do not
apply the due process analysis and must decide whether to admit the
identification under ordinary rules of evidence. The threshold for
admission of a voice identification under these rules is very low.34
The surest way to guarantee that voice identifications are not
excessively suggestive is to use an appropriately constituted voice
lineup. Consider the description by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts of a permissible procedure using a five-voice lineup:
After consulting with the office of the district attorney, the police
used a voice identification procedure that adequately protected the
defendant's rights. There was no one-on-one confrontation
between the victim and the defendant. The victim could not see the
participants during the procedure, nor could they see her. The
defendant selected the order in which he would read. The
participants read the same innocuous passage from a fifth-grade
reader. Defense counsel attended the procedure and, although
consulted, never objected to it. In addition, we have viewed a
videotape of the voice identification procedure, and conclude that
the procedure was not impermissibly suggestive. The defendant's
voice did not stand out because of his age, nor did any other aspect
of the procedure direct undue attention to the defendant's voice.
Hence, we conclude that the judge properly denied the defendant's
motion to suppress the voice identification.
33. See id.
34. See infra note 90 (discussing FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5)).
35. Commonwealth v. Miles, 648 N.E.2d 719, 728-29 (Mass. 1995).
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We do not endorse the Massachusetts procedure as flawless. For
example, there probably should be more than five voices in a lineup.36
But the court was clearly making a reasonable effort to ensure that
fair procedures would be used.
In contrast, one-on-one voice identifications are almost
inherently suggestive. For example, in Yeatman v. Inland Property
Management, Inc., a federal district court rejected an identification
when "[o]nly one tape containing only one female voice was played."
" Moreover, the witness "already knew the critical need to give an
affirmative answer to the question that she was being asked. And no
opportunity was given to [the opposing parties] to participate in or to
monitor the procedure."38 The court likened the identification
process to a "card trick" where "a magician forces on the person
chosen from the audience the card that the magician intends the
person to select, and then the magician purports to 'divine' the card
that the person has chosen."39 Similarly, State v. Johnson, a New
Jersey case, involved a woman who was raped by a man whose face
she could not see, but whose voice she heard.' She was asked to
come to the police station, and through an oplen door she heard the
voice of a suspect talking to a detective. After some initial
hesitation, she identified the suspect as her assailant.42 On appeal, the
court noted that the constitutional safeguards that apply to visual
identifications "are equally applicable to identification of a voice
through auditory senses," particularly because the risks of
misidentification "are even more apparent where the identification is
by voice alone."43 It concluded that the identification procedure was
sufficiently suggestive to require a Biggers analysis of reliability.'
In a Florida case, a man forced a woman off the road with his
van.45 She never got a good look at his face but heard him say, "lady,
I'm going to rape you and kill you." 46 Thirty-two days later she was
presented with a short tape recording of a detective interviewing a
suspect, who mainly said nothing beyond invoking his right to
silence.47 She identified him as her assailant.4" Later she attended a
36. See infra notes 229-31 for literature concerning the appropriate criteria for
assembling voice lineups.
37. 845 F. Supp. 625,628 (N.D. II. 1994).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 351 A.2d 787 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
41. Id. at 789.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 788.
44. Id. at 790-91.
45. Macias v. State, 673 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
46. Id. at 178.
47. Id. at 179.
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court session in which the same suspect was arguing that his bond
should be reduced, and she again identified his voice as that of her
assailant.49 Because the victim was presented with only one possible
voice in each situation, the appellate court held the procedure overly
suggestive."
Likewise, a Massachusetts court held that requiring a suspect to
utter the words of the perpetrator in open court, followed by the
victim's identifying the voice as that of the defendant, was
impermissibly suggestive." In addition, a Pennsylvania court found it
excessively suggestive when a rape victim identified her assailant
based on hearing his taped telephone confession. 2 Courts have also
found it improper to have a rape victim overhear a suspect being
interviewed at a police station and then ask her if the man was her
assailant. 3 Also improper was allowing a witness to see the defendant
during the voice identification process, casting doubt as to whether it
was really the defendant's voice that the witness was identifying."
Other courts have accepted some questionable identification
procedures. One Connecticut case held that a lineup consisting of
just two voices was not overly suggestive.5 The same result was
reached in a Louisiana case when a defendant's voice was one of
three in a voice lineup. 6
The second part of the two-step Biggers/Manson process is to
apply the Biggers criteria to determine whether a suggestive voice
identification was nonetheless sufficiently reliable.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Marini, the Massachusetts
court, having found identification procedures unduly suggestive, went
on to find the identification unreliable when nine months had elapsed
between the crime and the identification. 7
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 180.
51. 378 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1978).
52. Commonwealth v. Vanderlin, 580 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The court seems
to have largely assumed suggestiveness, at least for the sake of argument, but held that the
identification was sufficiently reliable nonetheless. See also Jackson v. State, 594 So. 2d
1289, 1295 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (detective played only a single tape of a statement by a
"suspect" to the victim, who identified his voice; held impermissibly suggestive).
53. State v. Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691, 696 (Mont. 1978); see also State v. Johnson, 674
P.2d 1077 (Mont. 1983) (victim allowed to listen to man being interviewed at police station
and identified him as her rapist; procedure held suggestive but sufficiently reliable under
Biggers).
54. State v. Atkins, Nos. 03C01-9302-CR-00058, 03C01-9302-CR00059, 1994 WL 81524
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 1994).
55. State v. Blevins, 536 A.2d 1002 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
56. State v. Pickney, 714 So. 2d 854 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
57. 378 N.E.2d 51, 59 (Mass. 1978).
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Most of the time, however, courts find adequate reliability.
United States v. Duran58 is typical. There, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
conviction for bank robbery. 9 Key evidence consisted of the tellers'
identification of the defendant's voice at trial.6° In response to the
defendant's argument that the identification was excessively
suggestive, the Court applied the Biggers factors, which the Ninth
Circuit had adopted for in-court eyewitness identifications. 6' The
Court concluded:
Again, both tellers had ample opportunity to listen to Duran's
voice during the robbery. Duran ordered the tellers to raise their
hands and demanded money. He ordered [a] teller to escort him
into the vault and to open it up. Inside the vault, Duran continued
to holler at [the teller], demanding the keys to the vault, telling her
to hurry, and asking where all the money was. He ordered [the
teller] back to the teller area and demanded the keys to the
remaining cash drawers. As Duran left, he threatened everyone in
the bank: "don't move or we'll kill you." Both tellers were likely
very attentive during the robbery given Duran's weapon and
threats, as evidenced by their accurate descriptions of Duran and
his distinctive voice and the fact that neither teller equivocated in
her identification of Duran's voice. Moreover, the in-court
identifications occurred just three months after the bank robbery.62
This analysis contains some questionable assumptions. For one,
three months may be a long time to remember a voice. For another,
the court's conclusion about the degree of attention is only that the
tellers were "likely attentive."63 The opinion demonstrates a judicial
recognition that reliability is an issue but does not provide much
analysis of what makes an identification reliable or unreliable.
4
A more convincing case for reliability was made in United States
v. Degaglia.65 Although the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly apply
the Biggers factors, it took seriously the fact that the agent identifying
the defendant's voice testified that he had heard it on several
occasions for periods of up to one and one-half hours and that the
defendant had a very distinctive voice, which the agent described as
"high pitched, raspy, and nasal." 66 Here, our intuitions are that the
identification is more likely to be reliable. Courts, in fact, frequently
58. 4 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1993).
59. Id. at 802.
60. Id. at 802-03.
61. Id. at 803; see also United States v. Carbajal, 956 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992).
62. Duran, 4 F.3d at 803.
63. Id.
64. Occasionally, state courts apply the Biggers criteria in voice identification cases,
especially when the issue is the distinction between a lineup and a showup. See Ohio v.
Mallet, No. 76608, 2000 WL 1176880 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2000).
65. 913 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990).
66. Id. at 374.
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hold identifications to be reliable when the witness testifies to having
heard the voice on multiple occasions." We will see that repeated
exposures to a voice really does have significant impact on accuracy
in experimental studies.68 The research suggests that the inverse is
also true: People do far worse identifying a voice that they have
heard only once.69
In summary, when an identification has occurred under
suggestive circumstances, courts require some indication that the
identification was nonetheless reliable as a condition for admissibility.
Non-suggestive identifications, in contrast, are not subjected to
scrutiny of their reliability. That issue is left to the trier of fact. In
Part II, we will explore factors that affect the reliability of voice
identification.
B. Voices on Tape
(1) Rule 901 and the Minimalist Approach
When the voice being identified is on tape, courts often do not
engage in the Biggers/Manson analysis. They do not consider how
suggestive the identification was and do not analyze the indicia of
reliability even when the identification was suggestive. Rather,
applying Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or a similar rule,
they permit a witness, often a police officer, to identify the voice and
leave the question of reliability to the jury.7°
Rule 901 states:
Requirement of Authentication or Identification
(A) General provision. The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.
67. See Virgin Islands v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding identification
sufficiently reliable when fifteen days elapsed between last attack and positive voice
identification and victim making identification testified that she had engaged assailant in
conversation during two separate attacks with hope that she would be able to identify his
voice); Tate v. Morris, No. 89-3570, 1990 WL 117367 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 1990) (Biggers
criteria met when victim heard rapist's voice on many occasions, including phone calls
made subsequent to the assault).
68. See infra note 158.
69. See Part II.A.2, infra.
70. The Second Circuit has actually held that the due process considerations relevant
to lineups do not apply to a voice identification under Rule 901(b)(5), at least with respect
to the facts of the case under consideration. United States v. Albergo, 539 F.2d 860, 864
(2d Cir. 1976).
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(B) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic
transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the
voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the
alleged speaker."
The advisory committee notes accompanying the rule make it
clear that experts should generally not be part of the process: "Since
aural voice identification is not a subject of expert testimony, the
requisite familiarity may be acquired either before or after the
particular speaking which is the subject of the identification, in this
respect resembling visual identification of a person rather than
identification of handwriting."72
The rule requires only "evidence sufficient to support a finding"
that the tape is what it purports to be, and just about anything is
sufficient. 3 The following statement by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is typical:
Rule 901(b)(5) establishes a low threshold for voice identifications
offered to determine the admissibility of recorded conversations.
So long as the identifying witness is "minimally familiar" with the
voice he identifies, Rule 901(b) is satisfied. The record reveals that
Speziale was present in Anchorage at Plunk's initial post-arrest
interview. The familiarity that he gained through that exposure
was sufficient under Rule 901(b)(5) to support his identification of
Plunk's voice on the tape recorded conversations being offered into
evidence. 4
The court took it as a given that the witness had gained sufficient
familiarity with the suspect's voice to identify it, despite his obviously
very limited exposure.
In many, if not most cases, this "minimally familiar" approach of
Rule 901 does not appear to create significant risk of
misidentification. For one thing, the identification often does have
substantial indicia of reliability. For example, sometimes the person
identifying the voice actually participated in the tape-recorded
conversation. 5 In other cases, the identifying witness almost certainly
71. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(5).
72. FED. R. EvID. 901 advisory committee's notes. In light of these remarks, the word
"opinion" in the rule is best understood as referring to lay opinion.
73. Of course, other rules apply as well. For example, the content of the tape must be
relevant to issues in the case. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
74. United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
75. United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1989) (person who identified
voices was an eyewitness and an active participant in the recorded conversations); People
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was familiar enough with the voice to identify it correctly.
Experience and research76 support the intuitions of7Tudges that people
typically can identify the voice of a close relative or that someone
who has heard a voice fifty or sixty times is likely to recognize it if he
hears it on a tape."8
Moreover, the circumstances under which the tape was made
usually provide ample evidence of reliability to reduce concerns
about possible due process violations. When an officer investigating
the defendant's conduct has recorded a wiretapped conversation
between two people, and one of the speakers used the wiretapped
phone at the defendant's residence, responded to being called by the
defendant's name, and said the kinds of things the defendant often
said, the defendant was most likely one of the speakers.79 Thus, when
the circumstantial evidence is robust, the risk of error is rather low,
even if the identifying witness's only experience with the voice was
when he heard the defendant speak six months earlier at the
defendant's arrest.80
Perhaps the most compelling circumstance is the existence of the
tape itself. Of course, it is possible to misidentify a voice on a tape.
But the tape limits the range of plausible identifications, and its very
existence provides the defendant with the opportunity to dispute the
identification through witnesses who testify to the contrary.
Furthermore, if a police officer identifies the speaker based on
minimal exposure to his voice, the identification obviates the need to
find and subpoena neighbors, former teachers, or others to do the
same thing. If it does not add significantly to the likelihood of
misidentification (an issue to which we return below), then the pro
forma authentication is efficient and not unfair.
In fact, courts have long permitted voice identification solely by
circumstantial evidence when the voice is on the telephone at a
number that the caller contacted. In one 1924 case decided by the
v. Griffin, 592 N.E.2d 930 (Ill. 1992) (participant in conversation testified that the tape
recording was accurate and identified the voice of the defendant); Hasley v. State, 786
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. App. 1989) (police officer secretly recorded defendant and then later
identified his voice on the tape).
76. See Part II infra.
77. See Mutz v. State, 862 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (permitting identification of
ex-father-in-law's voice when witness and defendant lived near each other and their
relationship had lasted seven years).
78. United States v. Phavong, No. 98-50230, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20882 (9th Cir.
July 12, 1999); see also United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995) (permitting
agent to testify that he knew voice on a particular tape belonged to defendant based on
agent's hearing defendant's voice frequently during a two-month wiretap).
79. See United States v. Ladd, 527 F.2d 1341, 1342 (5th Cir. 1976).
80. See id.
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First Circuit, three defendants appealed their mail fraud convictions.81
Part of the evidence involved telephone confirmations of dishonest
stock sales. 2  Regarding the identification of the voices on the
telephone as belonging to the defendants, the court held:
The gist of the problem is whether there was sufficient
identification of the persons in the Boston office calling the
witnesses, or later responding to the calls of the witnesses, so as to
justify the court in admitting the evidence. Plainly, recognition of
the voice is not the only means of identification. Circumstantial
evidence may be as persuasive as testimony that the voice is
recognized."
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,8
federal courts continue to permit identification of voices on the
telephone by circumstantial evidence alone." Occasionally, courts do
not even require that a taped voice be authenticated by someone with
knowledge of the voice, relying on telephone identification cases, and
not on Rule 901(b)(5). 6
Professors Risinger, Denbeaux, and Saks point to similar issues
in the law governing the identification of documents.87 While the
most compelling reason to consider a document as authentic often
involves the circumstances in which it was discovered (e.g., in the
defendant's desk drawer), the system also requires some formal
identification of the defendant as the document's author.88 The
acceptance of handwriting experts grew out of the need to provide an
identifying witness when there was no other witness available.89 To
the extent that courts treat the personal identification as a formality,
relying principally on the circumstantial evidence, the issues raised
with respect to speaker identification mimic those that arise in the
authentication of documents.90
81. Lewis v. United States, 295 F. 441 (1st Cir. 1924).
82. Id. at 443.
83. Id. at 444.
84. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(6) (dealing with the admissibility of telephone
conversations). For a discussion of what circumstantial evidence courts require, see 5
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
901.08 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1998).
85. United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, No. 98-1750, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2258, at
**4-5 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 2000); United States v. Degaglia, 913 F.2d 372, 376 n.4 (7th Cir.
1990).
86. See United States v. Puerta Restrepo, 814 F.2d 1236, 1241 (7th Cir. 1987).
87. D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance
as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification
"Expertise", 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731,752 (1989).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 754-59.
90. The advisory committee's note to Rule 901(b)(5) distinguishes voice and
handwriting identifications. Rule 901(b)(2) requires nonexperts to have familiarity with
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When defendants raise objections to intuitively unreliable
identifications of voices on tape, courts typically admit the evidence
anyway, leaving it to the defense to attack its validity at trial. In
essence, once a tape is admitted, its contents are considered
conditionally relevant,91 depending on whether the jury ultimately
decides that it really is the defendant's voice on the tape. Below is an
excerpt from a recent Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Knox. The
officer identifying the defendant's voice had heard it only once some
three years before his testimony at trial:
Special Agent Collins's testimony that he recognized Sam's voice as
that of Knox based on a conversation some three years earlier was
viewed with some skepticism by the district court. There is no
question, however, that this testimony is adequate to authenticate
Sam's voice as that of Knox for purposes of admissibility in
conformance with Fed. R. Evid. 901. All that is required under the
rule is that the identifier, Collins, have heard the voice of the
alleged speaker, Knox, "at any time." If the district court meant to
set a stricter standard-about which point we are, concededly,
uncertain-it abused its discretion. Of course, it will certainly be
open to the defendant to argue to the jury that Collins is simply
wrong, and that it is improbable that Collins could remember in
1996 a voice he heard in 1993. This is a question of the weight of
the evidence, however, not of its admissibility. 93
Even on its own terms, the Sixth Circuit's opinion reveals the
need for greater linguistic sophistication in voice identification cases.
The court invites defendants to argue that the witness identifying the
voice "is simply wrong, and that it is improbable" that he could
remember a voice that he had heard three years earlier." But what
makes it improbable? If people typically remember voices that well,
then it is not improbable. If they don't, then it is improbable. This is,
in other words, an issue that can and should be informed by scientific
research. As an initial matter, it will be up to defense attorneys to
educate themselves sufficiently to raise these issues, whether in
pretrial motions or at trial.
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction that rested in
part on the expert testimony of an FBI agent who identified the voice
on a tape as the defendant's. 95 It did not matter that the FBI "used
regular agents to make the identifications rather than using the voice
identification experts it has on staff," or that "the prosecution
handwriting "not acquired for purposes of the litigation." In contrast, a voice on tape may
be identified by someone who became familiar with the voice after the tape was made.
91. See FED. R. EvID. 104(b), 401.
92. No. 97-5492, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27655 (6th Cir. Oct. 22,1998).
93. Id. at **9-10 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at *9.
95. United States v. Lampton, 158 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 1998).
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admitted it had misidentified some of the parties on these phone
calls."96
Applying Rule 901, the Tenth Circuit has also required very little
evidence to support voice identifications,97 and the Second Circuit has
specifically rejected what it called a "rigid standard" regarding the
admissibility of tape-recorded evidence, noting that authentication
merely makes the tapes admissible, leaving the issue of reliability to
the jury." Similarly, an appellate court in New York state was
recently satisfied when an officer identified a voice on a tape based on
"a lengthy conversation he had with defendant on the day of the
arrest" some fifteen months earlier.99
The Seventh Circuit seems to apply a somewhat stronger
standard of reliability. For a tape recording to be admissible, the
government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it is
a "true, accurate, and authentic recording of the conversation, at a
given time, between the parties involved.' Yet what appears to be a
higher burden of proof largely dissipates in the great deference that
appellate courts give to the trial judge's decision. Such a decision is
not overturned on appeal absent "extraordinary circumstances."'0'1
Consider, for example, the Seventh Circuit's holding that a two-
hour conversation that a police officer had in English with a
defendant some two years earlier was enough to permit the officer to
identify a voice on a tape as being that of the defendant."° Although
reciting the "clear and convincing" standard, 3 the court held that
"questions concerning the length of Officer Johnson's previous
contact with Vega or the time between this contact and the
identification, simply go to the weight the jury accords this evidence,
not to its admissibility. "'4 It made no difference that the voice on the
tape was speaking Spanish. Thus, even jurisdictions that appear to
have a somewhat higher standard turn out, in reality, to apply the rule
similarly.
96. Id. at 259; see United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Once this
minimal showing has been made, the jury determines the weight to accord the
identification testimony.").
97. United States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1979) (permitting DEA agent to
identify voice on tape of a telephone call as defendant's, having heard defendant's voice
only once at a court hearing that occurred thirty days after the tape was made).
98. United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 2001).
99. People v. Rendon, 709 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
100. United States v. Faurote, 749 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1984).
101. Id.
102. United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1988).
103. Id. at 784.
104. Id. at 788.
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(2) Some Problems with the Minimalist Approach of Rule 901
The Supreme Court has held that the key issue for purposes of
due process analysis is the likelihood of misidentification. " In many
cases involving tapes, the identification procedure is suggestive, and
the witness's exposure to the voice is so minimal and, at times, so long
ago, that the identification cannot seriously be considered reliable.
In these cases, only the circumstances taken as a whole can provide
the indicia of reliability necessary to meet due process considerations.
When those indicia are absent, courts should take a closer look,
notwithstanding Rule 901's minimal standards.
Most opinions do not describe the procedure by which the
witness identified the defendant's voice. Yet it is only reasonable to
infer from these cases that the procedure is typically highly
suggestive. Much of the time, it appears that the prosecutor contacts
an officer who heard the defendant's voice, perhaps during an earlier
arrest, and asks him to identify it on a tape. 7 If it were otherwise, the
many opinions that reject challenges to authentications would
highlight additional facts that show the identification to be non-
suggestive. Moreover, if courts do not require more, why should the
prosecutor risk being unable to authenticate the tape by making the
identification procedure harder for the police officer than the law
requires?
Most courts have not applied Biggers/Manson criteria to the
identification of voices on tape. The few that have done so have
invariably found no due process violation, even when the
suggestiveness of the identification rings out. Consider United States
v. Zambrana, where a government agent identified the defendant's
voice as being on a tape recording and the court admitted it under
Rule 901."' The evidence of suggestiveness was particularly strong.
As the agent listened to a tape, he had a transcript that listed the
defendant's name in the margin. Nonetheless, the court held that
105. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, No. 97-5492, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27655 (6th
Cir. Oct. 22, 1998). See Part 11 infra for a discussion of the factors affecting the reliability
of an identification.
107. See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 369 (9th Cir. 1976), in which the court
described the relevant facts as follows:
On July 2, 1974, an FBI agent asked Officer Turley whether he knew Pheaster
and whether he could identify his voice. Upon receiving affirmative answers, the
agent played for Officer Turley a tape-recorded telephone conversation between
Mr. Adell and one of the kidnappers. Officer Turley identified the caller as
Pheaster.
108. 841 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1988).
109. Id. at 1338. The problem in Zambrana was compounded by providing the jury
with transcripts during the trial, once again with the defendant's name in the margin. The
court of appeals stressed that the judge did not admit the transcripts into evidence, warned
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this was not overly suggestive because the agent then went on to
identify the defendant's voice on additional tapes without a
transcript."'  Clearly the damage had been done. An initially
suggestive identification can taint later ones, and that was precisely
the risk in this case.'
Similarly, in United States v. Degaglia, the defendant was
recorded speaking on the telephone with a government informant."2
Later, he was arrested by an agent Olson, who spoke with him for
around ninety minutes at that time and also on a couple of
subsequent occasions."3 At trial, Olson identified the defendant's
voice as being on the tape."' The court rejected the defendant's
contention that the identification was overly suggestive, even though
Olson knew he was being called to court to identify the defendant's
voice on the tape.1'5 If Degaglia wanted to claim that it was not his
voice on the tape, he would have to do so at trial. 6
The procedure in Degaglia was very much like a showup. Rather
than being presented with a number of candidates from which to
choose, the identifier was just being asked to answer "yes" or "no" to
a single proposed candidate. Almost all courts, as we observed in the
previous section, would regard this procedure as impermissibly
suggestive in the earwitness context and would require a Biggers
analysis of reliability. In contrast, courts that look at suggestiveness
in the context of authentication of tapes by the police have found the
procedures to be adequate. 7
At the same time, it appears that the objections that defendants
raise to these identifications are almost always formal ones. The
defendant claims that the identification did not meet legal standards
the jury that it could not consider the names in the transcripts to constitute substantive
evidence, and did not let the jury take the transcripts with them during their deliberation.
Id. at 1339. Still, this procedure was quite suggestive, and in this day and age of word
processors it is quite unnecessary. It would be easy enough to use pseudonyms, or letters
like A and B. In another case in which a jury received transcripts with names in it, the trial
lawyers failed to object, and the issue was lost on appeal. United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d
779 (7th Cir. 1988).
110. Zambrana, 841 F.2d at 1339.
111. In the context of eyewitness identification, this phenomenon has been noticed in
both the scholarly literature and the case law. See, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440,
442-43 (1969). For a recent discussion, see Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey,
Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 475 (2001).
112. 913 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990).
113. Id. at 374.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 376-77.
116. Id. at 378.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1988).
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but provides no reason to believe that the identification is not
accurate, by producing alibi witnesses or witnesses who disagree with
the identification, for example. The absence of such evidence tends
to support the notion that Rule 901's minimal standards regarding the
identification of speakers on tape recordings do not generally result in
a serious risk of misidentification.
Nonetheless, there are several situations in which we believe the
system to be far too casual. First, if a defendant comes forward with
facts that raise concerns of a mistaken identification, then courts
should apply Biggers and evaluate the potential for misidentification
before admitting a suggestive identification of a taped voice based on
minimal exposure to it. Otherwise, we agree with most courts that
such analysis is generally not necessary as a prerequisite for admission
of a tape recorded voice into evidence. This balance requires greater
indicia of reliability when lax standards for admissibility create a
demonstrable risk of error. The suggested procedure, we believe, is
both loyal to the streamlined authentication process envisioned in
Rule 901 and respectful of the due process concerns that pervade this
area of law. On the one hand, courts will not be tempted to say that
suggestive identifications are not suggestive, creating precedents that
might affect later decisions when due process analysis really matters.
On the other hand, when evidence is produced that casts doubt on a
suggestive identification, the mechanical nature of Rule 901 will not
override due process concerns.
Second, courts should be careful not to admit a suggestive
identification of a recorded voice when the circumstantial evidence is
not strong. Consider a recorded bomb threat made from a public
telephone in a major city. Suppose that police arrest a malcontent
whom they suspect to have made the call. Should we allow one of the
arresting officers, who heard the suspect say a few words while being
booked, to testify that the voice on the tape belongs to the
defendant? Not only might the call have been made by any one of
millions of people, but telephones transmit only a limited range of
acoustic information, which is even further degraded by a tape
recorder.
Third, when there is no tape recording, the Biggers/Manson
analysis should clearly apply. A recent Fifth Circuit case applied only
the minimalist approach of Rule 901 in a case where a police officer
identified the defendant's voice as the one he had heard in a
telephone surveillance."' No tape was made. The facts do not show
whether the identification was suggestive enough to trigger
application of the Biggers criteria, but the issue should have been
118. United States v. Townsend, No. 97-60491, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13872 (5th Cir.
June 24, 1999).
[Vol. 54
SPEAKER IDENTIFICATION IN COURT
raised and discussed. Courts should not give the impression that due
process considerations are suspended when it is the police who make
the identification. As noted earlier, the Second Circuit has defended
Rule 901's minimalist approach to identifying voices on tape precisely
because the existence of the tape reduces the likelihood of
misidentification.'19 When no tape exists, the rationale disappears.
In deciding whether an identification meets due process
standards, courts must determine the reliability of lay voice
identification. Moreover, once the evidence is admitted, jurors must
determine how reliable the identification was. As we will see,
however, people are not very good at identifying voices, especially
under certain circumstances that have been the subject of
considerable study. And despite the tendency of many courts to leave
the issue to the jury, people do not always have good intuitions about
how much to rely on the accuracy of earwitness identifications. We
turn to the question of reliability below.
II. Voice Recognition Research and
the Reliability of Identifications
People make mistakes identifying voices even under the best of
circumstances. Guy Paul Morin's DNA exoneration in Ontario is a
startling recent reminder.' One of the earliest known cases of
speaker misidentification is the trial of William Hulet, who was
accused of having executed King Charles 1.121 Once the monarchy was
restored under Charles II, one of its first orders of business was to
prosecute for treason those involved in the regicide. The evidence
against Hulet consisted almost entirely of rumor and innuendo, much
of which would be excluded as hearsay today. Especially probative
was testimony by Richard Gittens, who not only was a witness to the
execution, but also belonged to the same regiment as Hulet did at the
time. Gittens testified that he had heard the executioner, whose face
was obscured, beg the king's forgiveness and that he knew that it was
Hulet "by his speech."' Cross-examined later by Hulet himself, who
asked him how Gittens knew that he (Hulet) had been on the scaffold
at the time, Gittens replied, "By your voice."' After deliberating for
more than the usual time, the jury returned to declare Hulet guilty of
high treason,' the punishment for which was normally a quite
gruesome death. This case might seem to be of little more than
119. See United States v. Albergo, 539 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1976).
120. See supra note 11.
121. Trial of William Hulet, 5 Howell's State Trials 1185 (1660).
122. Id. at 1186.
123. Id. at 1187.
124. Id. at 1195.
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passing historical interest but for a footnote inserted by the editors.
They report that the actual perpetrator was the ordinary hangman,
who later confessed, and that the court, "being sensible of the injury
done to [Hulet], procured his reprieve."'25
Rule 901(b) assumes that people are basically accurate in
identifying voices and realistic in their assessments of how likely it is
that an identification is correct. In this section, we examine some
research that suggests these assumptions are not entirely correct.
First, we look at research that addresses how good people generally
are at identifying voices. We will see that people are very accurate
when it comes to recognizing voices they know well but are much less
so with unfamiliar ones. We will also see that issues such as the
number of exposures to the voice, the delay in making the
identification, the skill of the identifier, and the presence of stress or
disguise, all play roles in determining whether an identification is
likely to be accurate.
We then ask whether we are realistic in our estimates of how
accurate identifiers are likely to be. We will see that there is little or
no relationship between confidence and accuracy, but jurors are likely
to take the identifier's level of confidence very seriously. We will also
see that people tend to overestimate the ability of others to identify
voices.
A. Factors Affecting the Reliability of Voice Identification
Researchers have uncovered a number of factors that make voice
identification easier or harder. Much of this work has been
conducted in Europe, Canada, and Australia and has thus been less
accessible to the American legal community.'26 These researchers
have found that familiarity with a voice, knowing in advance that one
will later have to identify a voice, length of exposure, the language
being spoken, foreign accents, length of the delay in performing the
identification, and other factors play significant roles in people's
ability to identify voices. Most of these factors are completely absent
from any discussion in the case law. In contrast, a witness's
confidence in the accuracy of the identification, which courts
sometimes consider relevant, does not correlate substantially with
correctness of identification. In this section, we look at empirical data
that teases out many of these factors.
125. Id. at 1185 n.t.
126. One of the most prolific writers on this subject is Professor Yarmey, a Canadian
psychologist. For a good summary of the research in this area, see A. Daniel Yarmey,
Earwitness Speaker Identification, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 792 (1995).
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(1) Familiarity
Just about everybody would assume that people are better at
identifying familiar voices than unfamiliar ones. The assumption is
largely correct, yet questions remain. How much difference does
familiarity make? Does it matter much how familiar the voice is?
What is the rate of error despite familiarity?
Some of these issues have recently been studied by Daniel
Yarmey and a group of his colleagues.12  In one study, sixty-eight
people agreed to participate as "speakers.' '128 Each recorded a sixty-
four-word passage, and then two minutes of spontaneous speech.29
The speakers were asked for the names of friends and associates who
might participate in a subsequent voice identification study.3' The
speakers also identified themselves as belonging to one of the
following categories with respect to each such friend or associate:
A hiFh familiar speaker: "[A]n immediate family member or best
friend."3
A moderate familiar speaker: "[A] co-worker, team-mate, club-
mate, or general friend.'
132
A low familiar speaker: "[A] casual acquaintance, such as next
door neighbor or associate, who would be expected to have talked
with the listener for only a few minutes on occasion in any week over
the last year.
' '133
The speakers were asked not to discuss the experiment with any
of the people that they named.
For each listener, the experimenters were able to find at least
one speaker who was a high familiar speaker, one who was a
moderate familiar speaker, and one who was a low familiar speaker.
The listeners were then presented with passages from four different
voices: three that varied with degree of familiarity, and also an
entirely unfamiliar voice."' Listeners were asked to say who the
speaker was, if they could, as soon as they recognized the voice."'
They then listened to the rest of the passage and were permitted to
change their minds if they thought they had initially made a
127. Yarmey et al., supra note 11.
128. Id. at 286.
129. Id. at 286-87.





135. Id. at 284.
136. Id. at 287.
137. Id.
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mistake.3 This experimental format should produce more correct
responses than one in which subjects do not have a chance to change
their minds.'39
Some of the results of this study40 are summarized in Table 1:
TABLE 1
Accuracy (percent) for Identifying Voices of Varying Familiarity 4'





These results are striking in several ways. First, as expected,
familiarity does matter. We are pretty good at recognizing the voices
of people we know well (89% correct), not as good at identifying the
voices of people we know casually (66% correct), and even worse at
acknowledging that we don't know a voice at all (61% correct).
In addition, many of the errors are false alarms: identifiers say
they recognize a voice as belonging to a particular speaker but are
wrong. Because listeners had the choice of stating that they did not
recognize a voice, one would have expected the total of "don't know"
answers to increase as familiarity lessens. That was not the case,
however. Instead, the false alarm rate went up as familiarity went
down. Moreover, false alarms account for a substantial percentage of
the errors for the unfamiliar voices; no less than 36% of subjects
claimed to recognize a voice they had, in fact, never heard before.
The Yarmey group's study is not unique in this finding. Earlier
work by Harry Hollien and his colleagues had reached a similar
conclusion.'42 Hollien's team presented subjects with recordings of
familiar and unfamiliar voices and then immediately tested them by
asking them whether a series of voices matched the one they had
138. Id. at 284.
139. In fact, it does. In another experiment reported in Yarmey et al., supra note 11,
subjects were not given a chance to change their minds. The correct response rates were
lower for three of the four levels of familiarity (high=85%, moderate=79%, low=49%,
unfamiliar=55%).
140. There were many other results, some of which we discuss below. For example,
listeners had a much harder time identifying the voices of whisperers. See infra Part
II.A.6.
141. Yarmey et al., supra note 11, at 291-92.
142. See Harry Hollien, Wojciech Majewski & E. Thomas Doherty, Perceptual
Identification of Voices Under Normal, Stress and Disguise Speaking Conditions, 10 J.
PHONETICS 139 (1982).
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heard.143 The study found that when a normal tone of voice was used
in the recording (as opposed to a stressed or disguised voice),'44
subjects identified familiar voices with 98% accuracy whereas
accuracy dropped with unfamiliar voices to only around 40%, even
with almost no lapse in time between the initial exposure and the
identification.'45 Contrary to what most people would expect, fewer
than half of the subjects were able to identify a previously unfamiliar
voice they had heard only a brief time before.
These results confirm our intuitions that people are generally
good at recognizing familiar voices. Yet they show remarkably high
rates of error in identifying unfamiliar voices. The assumption made
by many judges, that someone familiar with a voice can correctly
identify it, thus appears to be partially correct. It is true that someone
who is highly familiar with a voice can correctly select it from a
limited range of alternatives. However, the presumption made by
many courts that a policeman who briefly hears a voice once can later
identify it on tape seems quite questionable and becomes more
questionable as the number of potential target voices increases. The
high rate of mistaken identification of unfamiliar voices, which
parallels findings regarding eyewitness identification, is especially
troubling because of its potential to lead to false convictions.
(2) Amount of Exposure
From the earliest days of voice identification research,
experimenters have asked how much exposure to a previously
unfamiliar voice is sufficient.'46 Whether we are concerned about a
rape victim identifying the voice of her attacker, or a police officer
identifying the voice of the defendant as the one on the tape, the legal
system routinely deals with situations in which the witness identifying
a voice had only brief exposure to it.
In another set of experiments performed by Professor Yarmey,
subjects participated in a telephone conversation with the
experimenter.'47 The length of the conversation was either short
(average 3.2 minutes), medium (average 4.3 minutes), or long
(average 7.8 minutes).' Subjects then received a second phone call,
143. Id. at 141.
144. We discuss stressed and disguised voices infra Part II.A.6.
145. Hollien et al., supra note 142, at 142.
146. See I. Pollack, J.M. Pickett & W.H. Sumby, On the Identification of Speakers by
Voice, 26 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'Y AM. 403 (1954) (finding that duration of the sample is
important to the extent that it gives the hearer exposure to a larger array of different
sounds articulated by the speaker).
147. A. Daniel Yarmey, Voice Identification Over the Telephone, 21 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1868 (1991).
148. Id. at 1870.
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and were asked if they could identify the voice they heard in the first
call out of a lineup of six voices presented in the second call. 149 Half
the subjects heard a lineup that did not contain the first voice at all."'
The other half heard a lineup that did contain the first voice."' Some
of the subjects received this second call immediately after the first one(immediate test), some received it two hours later (two-hour delay),
and others received it two or three days later (two/three-day delay).
The results, once again, are not intuitively evident. First, the
interval between the two calls did not produce statistically significant
results, suggesting that vocal memory does not decay for two or three
days, given adequate exposure.' Second, the length of the original
exposure did matter.14 For subjects receiving a lineup that actually
contained the target voice, 24% who had a short original conversation
identified it, while 48% who had a long conversation identified it.155
Third, the rate of false alarms went up among those receiving a lineup
containing the target voice when the exposure to the voice was longer
(14% versus 35%), and was even higher (48%, 51%, and 44%) for all
116three lengths of exposure when the target was not present.
Consistent with what we saw in the previous section, people asked to
participate in a voice identification procedure seem predisposed to
identifying someone, even if that means making a mistake.'57
Other researchers have found that the number of initial
exposures to a voice (not just the length) is of critical importance.
Defenbacher and his team report a study in which one group of
listeners heard a sixty-second passage to which they were told to pay
close attention.158 When asked to identify that voice two weeks later
out of a voice lineup containing nine voices, they were correct 29% of
the time, made false alarms 14% of the time, and the rest of the time
did not know.159 A second group of subjects heard the same sixty
seconds of speech, but it was divided into fifteen to twenty second
segments and presented to them over the course of three consecutive






155. Id. at 1872.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1874-75.
158. Kenneth A. Defenbacher, John F. Cross, Robert E. Handkins, June E. Chance,
Alvin G. Goldstein, Richard Hammersley & J. Don Read, Relevance of Voice
Identification Research to Criteria for Evaluating Reliability of an Identification, 123 J.
PSYCHOL. 109 (1989). The reported study was conducted by two co-authors of the article,
A.G. Goldstein and J.E. Chance.
159. Id. at 111-12.
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days.' 6 Their hit rate was a perfect 100%. '61 The authors concluded
that a witness who hears sixty seconds of speech on one occasion is
less likely to recognize the suspect's voice later than is someone who
hears fifteen to twenty segments on three or four separate
occasions.1 62
Interestingly, when subjects heard a passage only half as long,
even the three-day distribution did not rescue them from poor
performance. Apparently, exposure to thirty seconds is not enough
to support recollection two weeks later, whether the passage is heard
163in its entirety or in separate segments.
The research thus shows that both amount and frequency of
exposure are significant in identifying a previously unfamiliar voice.
Consistent with our intuitions, a longer initial exposure will lead to a
more reliable identification later. Less intuitively obvious are the
findings that exposure of half a minute is generally too little and that
frequency of exposure is also relevant. As we have seen, the law
takes little account of such results. Hauptmann was convicted of
murdering the Lindbergh baby based largely on Lindbergh's being
exposed to the speech of the perpetrator for perhaps two or three
seconds. Even today, courts sometimes allow an identification based
on a very brief exposure, including in one case the single word
"yes." 164
To date, there is not much research on the amount of exposure it
takes to recognize familiar voices. We have all had the experience of
making mistakes in recognizing familiar voices, especially on the
telephone. Peter Ladefoged, an eminent phonetician who has studied
the voice identification issue, and whom one would expect to be quite
good at the task, has admitted that he could not even identify his own
mother's voice saying "hello."'65 In fact, he also did not recognize her
voice when the input was a full sentence.'66 A recent experiment by
Australian researchers confirms Ladefoged's experience as typical.
Based on the word "hello" alone, subjects were able to identify highly
familiar voices a mere 47% to 60% of the time.'67 Increasing the
length of the utterance to eight syllables resulted in 70% to 100%
accuracy.'68 This area is one that is ripe for additional research.
160. Id. at 112.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 117.
163. See id.
164. United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir. 1974).
165. Reported in Yarmey, supra note 126, at 797.
166. Id.
167. Phil Rose & Sally Duncan, Naive Auditory Identification and Discrimination of
Similar Voices by Familiar Listeners, 2 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 1, 8 (1995).
168. Id. at 10.
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(3) Delay
We all know that memory deteriorates over time, but research
shows that it doesn't happen linearly. It seems that we remember
voices quite well for some period of time, perhaps as long as a few
weeks, and then our memories fade significantly.
A simple, but elegant, experiment was published in 1937 by
Frances McGehee."6 9 The experiment, inspired by the Hauptmann
trial, aimed to determine how well people can identify unfamiliar
voices after extended periods of time. In the study, students
listened to a person reading a fifty-six-word passage from behind a
screen. 7 1  The students were asked at various subsequent times
whether they recognized any of five voices presented to them at the
testing session.' 72 The results are presented in Table 2:
TABLE 2











In a follow-up study conducted under somewhat different conditions,
McGehee found that performance deteriorated to 48% after a two-
week delay, but stayed more or less steady after that.
17 4
169. McGehee, supra note 10. The results are reported in a useful survey article, Ray
Bull & Brian R. Clifford, Earwitness Voice Recognition Accuracy, in EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 92, 116. Bull and
Clifford also report two of their own experiments. In one, they tested people after delays
of 10, 40, 100 and 130 minutes. They found that people were significantly more accurate at
ten minutes than at any of the longer times, but that the longer periods did not differ from
each other significantly. Id. at 118. In the second study, they looked at delays of ten
minutes, one day, one week and two weeks. Again, the only difference was between ten
minutes and all the others. Id. at 118-19.
170. McGehee, supra note 10, at 249-50.
171. Id. at 255.
172. Id. at 256.
173. Id. at 262.
174. Frances McGehee, An Experimental Study of Voice Recognition, 31 J. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 53 (1944).
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Similarly, Defenbacher and his team found significant decay in
recollection after two weeks, especially when the listener had only a
single exposure to the voice. '75 They concluded that "[i]f the initial
memory strength of the voice trace is weakly enough established,
then, voice identification accuracy will not be very impressive even at
delay intervals briefer than those possible in forensic situations.
176
While the numbers differ somewhat from one study to another,
perhaps depending on the amount and frequency of the initial
exposure, the overall picture is fairly clear. In identifying unfamiliar
voices, we perform much better if asked to do so immediately after
hearing the voice. If there is a delay beyond that, our memories seem
to remain fairly stable for a few weeks, after which performance
drops off significantly. Moreover, at least after a rather brief initial
period, the amount of exposure to the voice interacts with the length
of the delay.
Once again, we have seen little indication that courts making
evidentiary rulings take these findings into account, or that jurors do
so in evaluating evidence that has been admitted. The twenty-nine-
month delay in the Hauptmann case might still be acceptable today in
some courts. This is not to say that courts do not consider the issue of
time lapse; in fact, they almost always mention it. But they greatly
underestimate the extent to which memory for voices decays over
time. Consider the New York case in which a court allowed a
policeman to identify a voice on tape after a time lapse of fifteen
months,177 or the Knox case, where the delay was around three171
years. We are not claiming that it is impossible to remember a voice
for that period of time, but we do believe that the legal system should
take this cognitive frailty into account far more than it does.
(4) Individual Variation
Some people seem to be born musicians. They can hear a tune
once and sing it exactly on key. Others are virtually tone deaf. Do
we vary similarly in our ability to identify voices? The research is
clear: Some people are quite good at identifying speakers from their
voices, and other people are terrible at it. This should not be
surprising. We know from both personal experience and from
experimental testing that people differ enormously in their abilities to
175. Defenbacher et al., supra note 158, at 116.
176. Id.
177. People v. Rendon, 709 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
178. United States v. Knox, No. 97-5492, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27655, at **9-10 (6th
Cir. Oct. 22, 1998) (citation omitted).




recognize faces. 8° Why should voice recognition be different? The
legal system does not recognize such differences in skill. The rules of
evidence certainly do not, and we have never seen a published
opinion in which this issue was raised.
Experimenters have investigated the extent of individual
variation in identifying voices and have tried to determine whether it
is possible to predict ability to recognize voices from other cognitive
skills. In one recent study, Olaf Koster and some colleagues gave
thirty subjects (twenty-two non-expert subjects and eight expert
subjects) a test in auditory speech sensitivity.8' The test required
subjects to imitate the relative pitch of two sounds, the voice onset of
a syllable (voicing is turned on earlier in a syllable beginning with d
than with one that begins with t), rhythm, nonsense syllables, and
other linguistically-relevant sounds.82 The maximum possible score
on this test was 108.183 Scores varied from a low of fifty-five to a
perfect score of 108.'
These same subjects were also given a test of their speaker
recognition ability.' First, they listened to a five-minute sample of a
male speaking German (the entire experiment was carried out in
Germany in German).'86 After a five-minute break, subjects were
presented with eighteen samples of speech from each of six different
male speakers with similar voices, for a total of 108 samples. '87 One of
the six was the target voice, to which they had just been exposed. The
only task was to indicate, for each of these 108 speech samples,
whether it was uttered by the target." In a perfect performance, the
subject would identify all eighteen of the target's samples as the
target's ("hits"), and identify none of the other ninety samples as the
target's ("false alarms").9
The results showed great variation in ability. While eight
subjects got perfect scores, one subject made just about as many false
alarms as hits.' 9  Importantly, there were statistical correlations
indicating that people who perform better on the auditory speech
180. See Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face Memory, in EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 12, 36.
181. Olaf Koster, Markus M. Hess, Niels 0. Schiller, & Hermann J. Kuinzel, The
Correlation Between Auditory Speech Sensitivity and Speaker Recognition Ability, 5
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 22 (1998).
182. Id. at 23-24.
183. Id. at 25.
184. Id. at 27.
185. Id. at 25.
186. Id. at 25-26.
187. Id. at 26.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 27-28.
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sensitivity test are likely to be better at speaker identification.191 Yet
much of the correlation comes from the fact that poor performers on
the speech sensitivity test are typically not very good at speaker
identification. This suggests that in future work it will be easier to
predict poor identifiers than it will be to predict good identifiers.
What is clear right now is that in some cases the legal system should
permit defendants to inform the jury that some people are good at
identifying speakers and some are bad at it, even under the optimal
experimental conditions of this study."
When it comes to admitting tape-recorded evidence, judges
sometimes seem to assume that law enforcement officers will be
particularly good at this task, but little evidence supports this
assumption. Interestingly, experimental evidence suggests that police
officers are no better at eyewitness identification than lay witnesses.193
Thus, the law's main assumption regarding variation in voice
identification abilities is at best unproven and quite possibly wrong.
(5) Emotional State and Tone of Voice
Many crimes requiring voice identification as part of their
solution happen suddenly. This is especially true of violent crimes
such as rape, burglary, and robbery. The victim or other witness did
not see the perpetrator but is later asked if she can identify his voice.
One question we might ask is whether the stress of these experiences
heightens one's perceptiveness, making it easier to identify a voice
later, or whether stress has the opposite effect. Research on this issue
concerning eyewitness identification shows that stress makes us worse
at identifying faces, despite our intuitions to the contrary.194 Does the
same hold true for the identification of people by their voices?
In an interesting study, Saslove and Yarmey had 120
experimental subjects engage in what they were told was an
experiment on clairvoyance." While an experimenter was conversing
with a subject, an angry, hostile voice was heard from a tape recorder
in the next room for about twelve seconds. 96 The experimental
191. Id. at 29-30.
192. Other researchers have reached similar conclusions. See Gea DeJong, Earwitness
Characteristics and Speaker Identification Accuracy (1998) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with Lawrence Solan).
193. A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 159
(1979).
194. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 33-36 (1979); Ellis, supra note
180, at 20.
195. Howard Saslove & A. Daniel Yarmey, Long-Term Auditory Memory: Speaker
Identification, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 111 (1980).
196. Id. at 112.
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subjects were subsequently '97 asked to pick the voice out of a voice
lineup of five speakers.198 All five speakers uttered the same words as
the original angry voice."' For half of the subjects, the target voice
used the same hostile tone.20 For the other half, she used a calm
voice."01 In addition, half the subjects were told in advance that they
would be asked to identify a voice, while the other half were
uninformed. 22 Thus, there were thirty subjects in each of four
conditions.
The results, summarized in Table 3, are dramatic:
Table 3
Number of Subjects Out of Thirty Correctly
Identifying Speaker23
TONE OF TARGET VOICE
INSTRUCTIONS No CHANGE (ANGRY) CHANGE (CALM)
INFORMED 29 9
UNINFORMED 22 4
Since there were only five voices, one would expect six of the thirty
subjects responding to this condition to identify the target voice even
if everyone were guessing. In the hardest condition, where subjects
were uninformed and where the target tone of voice was different
from the original, subjects performed worse than chance. This study
suggests that voice identification based on short exposure under
stressful conditions is likely to be inaccurate, although that issue
remains controversial."°
The Saslove and Yarmey experiment also suggests that certain
voice qualities vary with the emotional state of the speaker. Research
shows this to be the case. For instance, a voice's fundamental
frequency, which relates largely to pitch, increases when we speak
under stress. Unfortunately, such changes are not always
197. By "subsequently" we mean either immediately or one day later. This lapse in
time was not significant, so we have combined the results for purposes of our presentation.
Below we will discuss the issue of the time it takes for memory of voices to decay.
198. Saslove & Yarmey, supra note 195, at 112.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 113.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 112-13.
203. Id. at 113.
204. For example, Hollien reports an experiment that showed that stress or arousal
improved the accuracy of earwitness identifications. HOLLIEN, supra note 179, at 201-02.
205. HOLLIEN, supra note 179, at 258-63; Marianne Jessen, Phonetic Manifestations of
Cognitive and Physical Stress in Trained and Untrained Police Officers, 4 FORENSIC
LINGUISTICS 125-47 (1997); see also Hermann J. Kiinzel, Effects of Voice Disguise on
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predictable, which means that to the extent that emotional states lead
to changes in voice quality, they complicate the process of voice
identification' 6 Note that in the Saslove and Yarmey experiment,
the rate of correct identifications was relatively good when subjects
were able to compare an angry target voice with other angry voices.
In contrast, their identification levels were quite low when they were
later asked to compare the originally angry voice with calm voices.
Because perpetrators of a crime are likely to be excited or angry,
and the victims under stress, voice identification in these
circumstances may be difficult. Yet that is precisely the condition, as
Saslove and Yarmey state, that "might be considered most similar to
the legal setting. ' ' One case where the suspect's tone of voice made
a difference was State v. Johnson, where a man was very calm and
soft-spoken while raping a woman. 8 When later confronted with his
voice through an open door at the police station, where he was
speaking in an angry and abusive tone, she could not positively
identify him.2 9 When he calmed down and spoke more normally,
however, she claimed to recognize his voice immediately."'
Although the emotional state and tone of voice of the speaker
are important in predicting the reliability of an identification, courts
do not take these factors into consideration as such. Part of the
reason may be that the Biggers factors were formulated primarily to
deal with eyewitness identification and therefore do not take into
account some of the specific factors relating to voice identification.
However, the Biggers criteria do include the degree of attention that
the witness was paying, which relates to the emotional state of the
witness. Courts seem to assume that stress increases the witness's
attention and thus the reliability of the identification. The extent to
which a witness was paying attention certainly is relevant, but the
evidence so far indicates that stress in itself undermines reliability.
(6) The Problem of Disguise
Even more troublesome for voice identification are attempts to
disguise one's voice or imitate the voice of someone else. The easiest
way to disguise a voice is to whisper. Many of the acoustic features
Speaking Fundamental Frequency, 7 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 149 (2000) (investigating
more closely the phonetic events that occur during voice disguise); Dagmar Boss, The
Problem of FO and Real-Life Speaker Identification: A Case Study, 3 FORENSIC
LINGUISTICS 155 (1996).
206. Gudrun Klasmeyer & Walter F. Sendlmeier, The Classification of Different
Phonation Types in Emotional and Neutral Speech, 4 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 104 (1997).
207. Saslove & Yarmey, supra note 195, at 115.




that permit us to identify a speaker (like voicing) are absent when
people whisper. Thus, the distinction between voiced consonants
(like z) and voiceless ones (like s) largely disappears when a person
whispers. As a result, the words zap and sap are difficult to
distinguish when whispered.
Yarmey and his colleagues, in the same set of studies discussed
earlier in connection with familiarity, had speakers record a speech
sample in a whisper. t ' Recall that the experiments compared
people's ability to identify voices based on their familiarity with the
speaker. When the passage was whispered, highly familiar voices
were identified correctly 77% of the time (versus 89% in a normal
tone), moderately familiar voices 35% (versus 75%), voices with low
familiarity 22% (versus 66%), and unfamiliar voices were
acknowledged as such 20% (versus 61%).212 False alarm rates were
also significantly higher.1 3 In short, a speaker who wishes to mask his
voice by whispering has a good chance of succeeding-especially if he
is not a very close friend or family member of the hearer, and even
then he might succeed. Perhaps more disturbing is that independent
panelists, when asked how often listeners were likely to be correct in
identifying whispered voices, wildly overestimated their capacity to
do so, guessing 91% for highly familiar voices, down to 74% for
unfamiliar ones (versus actual success rates of 77% and 20%).214 If
jurors have similar misconceptions about this skill, it is not good news
for defendants accused of having whispered an incriminating or
illegal statement.
Studies have reached similar conclusions regarding other types of
phonetic disguises. The Hollien group instructed speakers to mask
their voices however they wished.2 5 Experimental subjects were able
to identify disguised familiar voices 79% of the time but could do no
better than 20.7% with disguised unfamiliar voices.216 Tactics used in
some criminal contexts can lead to complex phonetic changes that
make speech significantly more difficult to identify. For example,
Brazilian kidnappers have been reported to place a pencil between
their front teeth, under the tongue, to disguise their ransom demands.
This leads to complex phonetic changes in scpeech that make the
speaker significantly more difficult to identify.
211. Yarmey et al., supra note 11, at 291.
212. Id. at 292.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 294.
215. Hollien et al., supra note 142, at 141.
216. Id. at 142.
217. Ricardo Molina de Figueiredo & Helena de Souza Britto, A Report on the
Acoustic Effects of One Type of Disguise, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 168 (1996).
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Imitation is an especially pernicious form of disguise. People
who are good at imitating the voices of others have the power to cast
suspicion on the innocent. How good are people at detecting
imitators? A study conducted in Sweden examined how well people
could identify in a voice lineup the voice of Carl Bildt, the former
Prime Minister of Sweden, who was well known to subjects."8 In one
set of conditions, Bildt's voice was present in the lineup along with
that of a good political impersonator, who imitated Bildt's voice." 9
Encouragingly, subjects almost always knew the real Bildt.22 ° But
when Bildt's voice was not among the choices, almost all subjects
mistook the impersonator's voice for Bildt's 2 ' These results suggest
that a good imitation can fool people, especially when the actual voice
is not present for comparison.
The emerging field of forensic phonetics is making progress in
characterizing various ways in which people can mask their voices but
still has not produced a systematic approach to the problem.22
Researchers have begun to determine what features of a speaker's
normal voice are likely to remain intact even when he tries to disguise
it.223  Yet disguise remains a problem, both for lay and expert
identification of voices.
(7) Foreign Languages, Accents, and Other Linguistic Variables
Research has shown that eyewitnesses are generally better at
identifying someone of the same race.2  Are people similarly better
at identifying speakers of their own language? In one experiment,
K6ster and Schiller investigated how well native speakers of Spanish
and Chinese can identify a German speaker by his voice.22 The
experimenters contrasted subjects who knew German as a second
language with those who knew no German at all.226
218. Frank Schlichting & Kirk P.H. Sullivan, The Imitated Voice-A Problem for Voice
Lineups?, 4 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 148, 149 (1997).
219. Id. at 151.
220. Id. at 155.
221. Id.
222. The International Association for Forensic Phonetics ("IAFP") has regular
conferences to discuss advances in the field, and a code of conduct governing expert
testimony by its members. See IAFP website, at http://www.iafp.net. The journal Forensic
Linguistics publishes a great deal of the relevant literature. Most of this work originates in
Europe.
223. See, e.g., Geoff Lindsey & Allen Hirson, Variable Robustness of Nonstandard /r/ in
English: Evidence from Accent Disguise, 6 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 278 (1999); Herbert
Masthoff, A Report on a Voice Disguise Experiment, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 160 (1996).
224. See YARMEY, supra note 193, at 130-31.
225. Olaf Koster & Niels 0. Schiller, Different Influences of the Native Language of a
Listener on Speaker Recognition, 4 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 18 (1997).
226. Id. at 19.
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Subjects were presented with a five-minute sample of a native
speaker of German speaking in that language.27  They were then
asked to identify the speaker from a voice lineup consisting of six
native speakers of German. 28 The results show that Spanish speakers
who know some German performed significantly better than Spanish
speakers who do not know German. 29 The same result held for the
Chinese speakers.20  These findings suggest that results of voice
lineups involving speech samples in a language that the witness does
not understand should, as the authors note, "be handled with
caution."23'
A study by Charles P. Thompson came to a similar conclusion,
while providing some further details.232 The voices were produced by
Spanish-English bilingual speakers.233 Some samples were in Spanish,
others in English, and yet others in English with a Spanish accent.3
Each sample was presented, along with five others of the same type,
to monolingual English speakers who had been familiarized with the
target voice one week before. 23 ' Results confirmed that English
speakers are much worse at identifying someone speaking Spanish.236
When confronted with speakers using English with a Spanish accent,
the accented voices were recognized better than Spanish voices, but
worse than English ones.
A variation on this experiment was conducted by Goggin and her
colleagues.2 38 This research team employed a similar methodology
but used listeners who were bilingual in English and Spanish.239 As
opposed to monolingual English speakers, the English-Spanish
bilinguals did not differ significantly in their ability to identify targets
speaking English, Spanish, or English with a Spanish accent.
The fact that it is significantly more difficult to identify someone
speaking an unknown language reveals that the term voice
identification is actually a misnomer. If the task were simply to
227. Id. at 22.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 23.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 25.
232. Charles P. Thompson, A Language Effect in Voice Identification, 1 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 121 (1987).
233. Id. at 122.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 123.
236. Id. at 124,126.
237. Id. at 125.
238. J. P. Goggin, C. P. Thompson, G. Strube & L.R. Simenthal, The Role of Language
Familiarity in Voice Identification, 19 MEMORY & COGNITION 448 (1991).
239. Id. at 453, 455.
240. Id. at 456.
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identify a voice, it would logically make no difference at all whether
we understand the language. In fact, it does matter. The reason is
that the ultimate task is to identify the speaker. The quality of the
speaker's voice may be an important clue in this endeavor, but it is
not the only one. We also use other linguistic variables that depend
on our ability to understand what is said and how it is said. Hollien's
team, for example, lists a number of speech characteristics that
listeners use to identify the speaker, including dialect, unusual use of
linguistic stress or affect, idiosyncratic language patterns, speech
impediments, and idiosyncratic pronunciations."'
We have the most nonacoustic (or "non-voice") information at
our disposal when we hear someone speak our native language, less
when the speaker is not a native speaker of our language, and none at
all when the language we hear strikes us as merely a babble of
meaningless sounds. What if subjects are confronted with an actual
babble of meaningless sounds? Niels Schiller and colleagues
presented what was essentially a long series of mamamamama to
native English and German speakers, along with some English
speakers who had studied German.242 Correct identification of the
speaker was low for all three groups, especially when compared to the
success rate of a native speaker of a language who is asked to identify
speech produced by other native speakers of that language. 3
The effect of general speech characteristics on voice
identification has not been extensively studied.2  Fortunately, some
courts seem to have an intuitive notion that foreign accents may
present a problem and have sometimes required expert testimony if a
witness is to identify a voice by its accent.2  Others, as we saw above,
seem to consider it largely irrelevant that a speaker was speaking
Spanish on one occasion and English on another.
241. HOLLIEN, supra note 179, at 198.
242. Niels 0. Schiller, Olaf Koster & Martin Duckworth, The Effect of Removing
Linguistic Information Upon Identifying Speakers of a Foreign Language, 4 FORENSIC
LINGUISTICS 1 (1997).
243. Id. at 10, 11.
244. For a study on how foreign accent can help identify a speaker--or eliminate a
suspect-see Henry Rogers, Foreign Accent in Voice Discrimination: A Case Study, 5
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 203 (1998). On the difficulty that many Swedish speakers have in
successfully imitating regional accents, see Duncan Markham, Listeners and Disguised
Voices: The Imitation and Perception of Dialectal Accent, 6 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 289
(1999).
245. People v. King, 584 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (not permitting lay
witness to testify about whether defendant speaks with a Jamaican accent). But see People
v. Sanchez, 492 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (permitting lay witness to testify about
perpetrator's accent, but acknowledging that expert linguistic testimony might sometimes
be necessary).




This discussion of factors bearing on our ability to recognize
voices is by no means exhaustive. For example, age plays a role in the
reliability of voice identification. Speakers between twenty-one and
241forty are better voice identifiers than are adults over forty.
Moreover, people's voices change as they get older.248 In fact, that
issue arose in a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. "9 In that case, the defendant's voice was
recorded in 1971, but it wasn't until 1975 that an agent met the
defendant and compared the voice on the tape to the voice he had
heard.5 The defendant argued that this four-year delay made the
identification improper. The court disagreed, applied Rule 901, and
stated that the delay should go to the weight that the jury gives to the
evidence."'
Nonetheless, we have attempted to touch on the most legally-
relevant research on how good people are at identifying voices. The
legal system relies almost entirely on its own notions of common
sense and intuition and has never systematically taken this knowledge
into account. Moreover, to the extent that the law purports to require
some investigation into the reliability of an identification, the
research reported here suggests that the Biggers criteria fall seriously
short of the mark.
B. Witness Confidence
Among the criteria for predicting reliability that the Supreme
Court endorsed in Biggers is "the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation.""' Research shows that jurors, like
judges, take statements of confidence seriously. Unfortunately,
research also indicates that there is at best a limited relationship
between the probability of accuracy and the degree of confidence that
the witness has in the identification. If people react positively to the
confidence of the identifier and confidence fails to predict accuracy,
247. Ray Bull & Brian R. Clifford, Earwitness Voice Recognition Accuracy, in
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 92, 95-97.
Similarly, whether because of attention and motivation, or because of cognitive
development, fifteen- to sixteen-year-olds perform better than twelve-year-olds at
identifying voices. Id.
248. Id. See discussion of how the relative ages of the speaker and listener might affect
identification, infra note 251.
249. United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 513 (1st Cir. 1976).
250. Id.
251. Recent research suggests that the court was right in this decision. See Harry
Hollien & Reva Schwartz, Aural-Perceptual Speaker Identification: Problems with
Noncontemporary Samples, 7 FORENSIC LINGUSITICS 199 (2000).
252. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
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then we might expect people to overestimate the likelihood that an
identification will be accurate. That is just what seems to happen.
Several researchers have studied the relationship between
accuracy and confidence in connection with speaker identification.253
For the most part, the research indicates little positive correlation.
Defenbacher et al., who set out to study the significance of the factors
suggested in Biggers, conclude from their studies that the Supreme
Court was probably wrong. "The safest generalization to make is that
earwitness as well as eyewitness confidence are not very reliable
indices of identification accuracy. 2 14  Yarmey's review of the
literature led him to reach the same bottom line.255
Moreover, jurors are likely to be swayed by confidence levels. A
recent study by Amy Bradfield and Gary Wells shows that people pay
a great deal of attention to how confident a witness is in his
identification in deciding how much weight to give it.256 This bias can
lead to insufficient skepticism on the part of jurors whose job it is to
assess the reliability of a witness's identification.
Finally, people seem to have an inflated sense of how good we
are, as human beings, at identifying voices. Recall the study by the
Yarmey team demonstrating that people are much more successful at
identifying highly familiar voices than they are at identifying voices of
moderate or low familiarity, or identifying unfamiliar voices. 257 In a
related study discussed in the same article, another set of
experimental subjects was asked to estimate how good listeners
would be at identifying voices from each of the four levels of
familiarity.258 For every level of familiarity, people assume that
identifiers will be more accurate than is the case. 2"9 This gap between
perception and reality suggests that jurors may be predisposed to give
too much weight to identification by voice.
These results have serious ramifications. Prosecutors must prove
their cases beyond a reasonable doubt. Although jury instructions do
253. This issue has also been widely studied in the context of eyewitness identification.
See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 13, at 94-95.
254. Defenbacher et al., supra note 158, at 115.
255. Yarmey, supra note 126, at 803 ("The above research has consistently failed to
reach .50 correlation coefficients, which reinforces the conclusion that earwitness
confidence is an unreliable criterion to judge speaker identification accuracy.").
256. Amy J. Bradfield & Gary L. Wells, The Perceived Validity of Eyewitness
Identification Testimony: A Test of the Five Biggers Criteria, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 581
(2000).
257. Yarmey et al., supra note 11.
258. Id. at 287-88.
259. For highly familiar voices, subjects predicted 97% accuracy, while identifiers were
89% accurate. For moderately familiar voices, subjects predicted 89% accuracy, while
identifiers were 75% accurate. For low familiarity, the predicted and actual numbers were
90% and 66%, respectively, and for unfamiliar voices 85% and 61%.
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not use numerical certainty thresholds, most people within the
system, when asked, say that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
requires about a 90% level of certainty." Based on this experimental
data, people appear to assume that under most circumstances voice
identification is correct about 90% of the time; but in reality, it is
significantly less reliable, especially when we are not very familiar
with the voice being identified. The legal system's failure to correct
this overestimation may result in some jurors wrongly concluding that
the government has met its burden of proof.
Taken together, these facts tell a disturbing story. People rely on
an identifier's level of confidence in judging how accurate the
identification is likely to be. But that level of confidence correlates
only slightly with the likelihood of accuracy. The result is that people
tend to place too much credence in an identification. Again, this
situation cries out for judicial safeguards. We present some possible
solutions to these problems at the end of this Article.
III. Expert Voice Identification
When the issue is the admission of a tape-recorded voice,
someone must determine whether the defendant's voice matches the
voice on a tape. We have seen that in the typical case a witness,
usually a police officer, is called to identify the voice as that of the
defendant. The question we ask here is whether training in voice
identification, or phonetics in general, is helpful in this task. If so, it
calls into question the statement in the Advisory Committee notes to
Rule 901 that "aural voice identification is not a subject of expert
testimony." '261
We then turn to the question of sound spectrography, or
voiceprints, a largely mechanical method that is claimed to be able to
distinguish voices. If such a method is reliable, it could prove quite
useful, not only in laying a foundation to admit tape recorded
evidence, but also to help prove the ultimate issue of the identity of
the speaker. As we will see, voiceprints are more reliable than is
sometimes suggested in the literature, but questions still remain,
especially when recordings are made in settings that are less than
ideal.
A final role that experts might perform is to inform courts and
juries about the ability of people to make lay voice identifications.
For example, it might have been helpful to Hauptmann's defense to
have had an expert testify about some of the problems with
260. For a summary of this work, see Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of
Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105,
125-29 (1999).
261. FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note, subd. (b), ex. 5.
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Lindbergh's identification of Hauptmann's voice. Whether conveyed
by an "educational expert" or by jury instructions, the type of
learning discussed in this Article should make its way to the jury
when a case rests in part on a questionable identification of a speaker.
A. Aural Identification by Experts
Consider a case in which the issue is whether the voice on a tape
recording is the defendant's voice. The question arises in many drug
and organized crime cases. As we have seen, some people are better
at making this comparison than are others.262 Here, we ask whether
linguistic experts specializing in phonetics are typically better than lay
people at aural identification (i.e., identification by ear as opposed to
using machines). The answer seems to be yes.
Hollien and Schwartz tested people's abilities to identify voices
by comparing contemporary samples with non-contemporary ones."'
All samples were on tape.' 64 There were three groups of subjects:
people with no background in phonetics, experienced phoneticians,
and students with some background in phonetics.265 The results are
presented below:
TABLE 4
Effect of Expertise on Voice Identification Skill"6
LENGTH OF DELAY LAY SUBJECTS PHONETICIANS STUDENTS
4 WEEKS 74% 89% 76%
20 YEARS 32% 74% 33%
From these results, it appears that training in phonetics increases
performance on identification tasks.
In another study, Schiller and Ki5ster had six male native
261
speakers of German record a passage that lasted about one minute.
For each speaker, three pieces were spliced out of the original tape,
and each of those three pieces was recorded six separate times,
making a total of 108 speech samples (6 x 3 x 6 = 108).268 Twenty-
seven subjects participated in the experiment.2 69  Seventeen were
262. See Bull & Clifford, supra note 247, at 94-105.
263. Hollien & Schwartz, supra note 251.
264. Id. at 203.
265. Id. at 204.
266. Id. at 206.
267. Niels 0. Schiller & Olaf K~ster, The Ability of Expert Witnesses to Identify Voices:
A Comparison Between Trained and Untrained Listeners, 5 FORENSIC
LINGUISTICS 1 (1998).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 2.
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college students, and ten were experts in phonetics.27 For each
subject, one of the original six speakers was designated as the target.271
The subject listened five times to the target reading the entire
passage.2"2 Then, after a five minute break, subjects were presented
with all 108 short segments, and instructed to indicate whether the
segment was uttered by the target."'
Both expert and lay subjects did very well on this test, which was
designed around ideal conditions.27 4 Still, the experts performed
significantly better (98% hits, 1% false alarms) than the lay subjects
(92% hits, 2% false alarms).275 The differences may not look
dramatic, but the reduced error rate would certainly be important in a
trial setting.276
A second study by Koster et al. resulted in a similar finding."'
Experts in speech or singing and non-experts participated in a voice
identification task.278 While half of the non-experts (eleven of twenty-
two) were poor identifiers, only one quarter of the experts (two of
eight) were poor identifiers.27 9 Although the number of subjects is
low, the study suggests that the use of experts may improve the
accuracy of voice identification under certain forensic
circumstances.280 Significantly, these studies highlight the fact that
phonetics is an independent field of scientific research, which takes
seriously the need to investigate its own strengths and limitations.
This internal scrutiny distinguishes it from other areas of forensic
identification, such as handwriting analysis and microscopic hair
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 4.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Here, as in any forensic identification testimony, one must take into account that
the experimental studies, conducted under controlled conditions, are relatively free of
"observer biases." In the actual setting, both experts and lay witness understand the
consequences of their answers to the possible outcome of the case. For further discussion,
see D. Michael Risinger Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert Rosenthal, The
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002).
277. See Koster et al., supra note 181. As discussed above, the study showed
correlation between voice identification ability and performance on a speech sensitivity
test.
278. Id. at 27.
279. Id. at 27-29.
280. See Ricci v. Urso, 974 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that detective did not have
expert training in voice identification).
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analysis, which have received substantial criticism in the legal
literature.28'
These results do not mean that the system should require expert
identification of voices on tapes. But they do suggest that the courts
should be receptive to such experts in cases where voice identification
is critical, especially when the admission of the tape into evidence is
based on little exposure to the voice.28 Expert phoneticians may also
be appropriate when a police officer or other witness becomes
familiar with a voice secifically in order to become eligible as an
authenticating witness.
Consider United States v. Drones, in which the Fifth Circuit
recently reversed the district court's grant of the defendant's petition
for habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel. . The
case against Drones, who was convicted of various drug crimes in a
Texas state court, depended heavily on a police officer's identification
of his voice on a tape. 5  His attorney, however, did nothing to
challenge the identification.286 Later, after new counsel was retained,
witnesses who knew Drones listened to the tape, and concluded that
it was not his voice.2 7 In addition, a voice identification expert opined
from both aural and spectrographic analysis that the voice on the tape
was not that of Drones.' The government also had an expert who
debunked spectrographic analysis but agreed that the voice on the
tape did not sound like that of the defendant.289
The Fifth Circuit held that the original lawyer did not act
irresponsibly in not pursuing the lay testimony, which may have
opened up other questions about the defendant's background. 29 It
also held that it was not irresponsible of the original lawyer not to
pursue spectrographic comparison of Drones's voice with that on the
tape, since courts have not been receptive to such analysis in recent
years.29 ' But the court never said why the defendant's lawyer should
not have had an expert study both the tape and exemplars of the
defendant's voice and offer his opinion based on aural analysis.292 At
281. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1998).
282. See supra Part I.B.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 807-09 (7th Cir. 1988).
284. 218 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 2000).
285. Id. at 498.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 499.
288. Id. at 498.
289. Id. at 499.
290. Id. at 501.
291. Id. at 504. We discuss, and agree with this aspect of the holding, infra note 356.
292. See infra note 346 for a discussion of how current doctrine concerning the
admissibility of expert testimony impacts on voice identification expertise.
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the very least, an expert could have pointed out to the jury ways in
which particular sounds differed from one sample to the other and
left it to them to agree or disagree. The case is especially compelling
because the government's own expert shared the defense expert's
opinion293 and because the standards for admitting the original
identification are so relaxed.
In fact, courts have permitted expert phoneticians to present
opinion testimony on speaker identification when the voice is on
tape."' Their expertise is parallel to that of other experts who are
permitted to assist the jury on questions of identification. For
example, experts are permitted to interpret surveillance photos to
point out similarities between the facial features of the defendant and
the individual in the surveillance photo.295 In one case, it was held to
be reversible error not to permit the defendant to offer such
testimony to the jury.96 While these experts are not always permitted
to offer opinions as to identity, they are routinely allowed to share
with the jury detailed observations regarding facial shape and
measurement.
At the very least, phoneticians should be permitted to point out
similarities and differences between the defendant's voice and that of
the person on a tape in order to make them salient to the jury. To the
extent that such analysis can be enhanced by comparison of the
relevant features of spectrograms, we see no reason why the experts
should not be permitted to use that information as well. For example,
to enhance her testimony based on aural comparison of two voices, a
phonetician may want to show a jury how one speaker's [a] sound
routinely appears in one area of the spectrogram, while the [a] sound
on the tape that is in evidence appears elsewhere. Most phoneticians
use both types of information.9 This use of acoustic information is
quite different from that used by so-called voiceprint experts, whose
claims have been a matter of controversy for several decades, an issue
to which we now turn.
B. Spectrographic Evidence
DNA evidence has become an important forensic tool, both for
law enforcement agencies and for those who have been wrongly
293. Drones, 218 F.3d at 499.
294. See infra note 388 describing Professor Hollien's testimony.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 825 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1084 n.14 (9th Cir. 1983); see also 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 84, § 702.02[2].
296. United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1987).
297. See HOLLIEN, supra note 179; Francis Nolan, Speaker Identification Evidence: Its
Forms, Limitations, and Roles (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Hastings Law
Journal).
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accused. A technology able to compare voices with such accuracy
would obviously be a welcome addition to the criminal justice system.
For a time, at least, there was hope that "voiceprints" could play that
role. Voiceprints, or technically "sound spectrograms," are visual
representations of the frequencies and amplitude of sounds as
represented on a time line. In the forensic setting, spectrographic
analysis involves visual comparison of the spectrogram of the
questioned voice with one from a known voice, typically the voice of
the defendant in a criminal trial. Most of those who conduct this kind
of analysis are not phoneticians, but rather police officers and
technicians who have been trained for this specific task and typically
have limited backgrounds in acoustics or phonetics. The main issue is
whether the methodology produces sufficiently reliable results.
The early history of this debate is both legally significant and
interesting in its own right. Sound spectrography was developed in
the 1940s by Bell Laboratories for teaching deaf people how to
speak2 98 and was quickly pursued for use in military operations during
World War IIV" Then, in 1962 Lawrence G. Kersta, of Bell Labs,
published an article in Nature, making some extravagant claims about
the ability to identify speakers by their voiceprints.' He likened this
technology to fingerprints and asserted that people's voices are also
unique and identifiable through visual inspection of their
voiceprints."' The scientific community reacted skeptically. For
example, the Committee on Speech Communication of the Acoustical
Society of America had the following reaction:
We conclude that the available results are inadequate to establish
the reliability of voice identification by spectrograms....
Procedures exist, as we have suggested, by which the reliability of
voice identification methods can be evaluated. We believe that
such validation is urgently needed.32
298. See HOLLIEN, supra note 179, at 90-91.
299. See Oscar Tosi, Herbert Oyer, William Lashbrook, Charles Pedrey, Julie Nicol &
Ernest Nash, Experiment on Voice Identification, 51 J. ACOUSTICAL Soc'Y AM. 2030,
2031 (1972).
300. L. G. Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962). Toward the
conclusion, Kersta writes: "It is my opinion, however, that identifiable uniqueness does
exist in each voice, and that masking, disguising, or distorting the voice will not defeat
identification if the speech is intelligible." Id. at 1257. For a discussion of Kersta's
scholarship, see PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 10-2, at 299 (2d ed. 1993).
301. Kersta, supra note 300.
302. Richard H. Bolt, Franklin S. Cooper, Edward E. David, Jr., Peter B. Denes, James
M. Pickett & Kenneth N. Stevensal, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: A
Scientist's View of its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'Y AM., 597,
603 (1970).
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Prominent phoneticians, including Dr. Peter Ladefoged of UCLA,
went on record as opposing the use of spectrography in the
courtroom as inadequately tested.03
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, American jurisdictions
were divided on the issue of spectrographic evidence. Some courts
rejected the methodology as not widely enough accepted within the
scientific community."° Typically, these jurisdictions applied the Frye
test, which stated that for expert opinion testimony to be admitted,
"the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs."05 Other appellate courts reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that it was within the discretion of the trial judge
to admit the testimony because the technology showed indications of
being sufficiently reliable."6
At this same time, Oscar Tosi, a Michigan State University
professor, published studies that purportedly demonstrated great
accuracy in the identification of speakers by visual inspection of
voiceprints."7 Tosi's design corrected the worst problems with
Kersta's study. While Kersta used a closed set of possible voices and
contemporaneous recording under laboratory conditions, Tosi's study
compared non-contemporaneous recordings in both fixed and
random contexts, which more closely simulated forensic settings.3 8
Tosi's results were impressive. There were approximately 6% false
alarm errors and approximately 13% false elimination errors.3 9 He
conjectured that the error rate could be reduced further if the
examiner is permitted to answer "I don't know" if he did not reach a
high level of certainty."'
The Tosi study led to modification of Professor Ladefoged's
opposition to the use of voiceprints, but his softening was hardly a
ringing endorsement. Ladefoged expressed his position in a 1971
303. See Peter Ladefoged & R. Vanderslice, The Voiceprint Mystique, in WORKING
PAPERS IN PHONETICS No. 7, at 126 (UCLA Dept. of Linguistics Nov. 1967).
304. See, e.g., State v. Cary, 239 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968).
305. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
306. See, e.g., State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432, 440-41 (Minn. 1971).
For a catalogue of these early cases, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAY, MICHAEL
J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 25-1.0, at 190 (1997). See also Lisa Rafferty, Note, Anything
You Say Can and Will be Used Against You: Spectrographic Evidence in Criminal Cases,
36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 291 (1999).
307. See Tosi et al., supra note 299. This was not Tosi's first study, but it was the
seminal one.
308. Id. at 2033.
309. Id. at 2041.
310. Id.
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letter to the President's Science Advisor. 1 In the letter, he expressed
concern that the Tosi study did not deal with the problem of people in
the same community, say a gang of high school dropouts, who might
have very similar speaking styles and mutually confusable voices.312
He also expressed concern about the lack of standards governing
voiceprint experts and their work.313 The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit summarized his position:
As Dr. Ladefoged's cited letter to the President's Science Advisor
itself indicates, however, his conversion to the voiceprint
identification technique has been a limited one. While Dr.
Ladefoged stated that new evidence had moved him to 'cautiously
reconsider the possibility' of the use of spectrogram analysis in
criminal trials, he went on to express a number of continuing
reservations. He pointed out, for instance, that the Tosi studies did
not necessarily indicate that spectrogram analysis would enjoy a
comparable success rate when applied to the general populace, and
indicated that voiceprint identification of females would probably
be more difficult than identification of males. Dr. Ladefoged
further identified problems arising from voice mimicry and from
the possibility of "confusable voices," and concluded that "we do
not at the moment know the probable error rate" of a spectrogram
analysis technique applied to the broad populace. Thus, viewed in
its entirety, Dr. Ladefoged's letter, as he himself characterized it in
his testimony, simply reflects a position "of abatement of
skepticism towards voiceprint," not one of complete acceptance.
This position, according to his testimony, was shared by the
community of scientists."'
311. The letter was published as Peter Ladefoged, An Opinion on Voiceprints, in
WORKING PAPERS IN PHONETICS No. 19, at 84 (UCLA Dept. of Linguistics June 1971).
312. Id. at 85.
313. Id. at 87.
314. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citations omitted)
(rejecting voiceprint testimony under the Frye standard). Subsequently, Dr. Ladefoged
actually testified in favor of the use of spectrograms in the courts. But his testimony
remained guarded:
Q. Is it then, sir, your testimony that at this time you feel that the use of the voice
spectrograph in the identification of or comparison of known voices with
unknown voices is a scientifically acceptable method for identification?
A. Given certain safeguards so that it's performed by a process or that the
recordings that the investigator has truely [sic] identified and of no noises or
background, undue degree of background noise, given also the fact that there is
no claim that these are women's voices of high pitch which make it difficult, also
that there is no claim that this is somebody mimicing [sic] somebody else's voice,
the defendants, that is somebody mimicing and you can say there is a skilled
mimic who is able to mimic very well, then I think that's most of the
circumstances, yes, and, oh, and also given the fact that the court is advised of the
fact that this is not 100 percent, yes, I would agree that this is a technique that is
useable [sic] in a court of law.
People v. Law, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 716 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (alterations in
original).
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In an introductory text to phonetics dating from that same
period, Ladefoged explained that it was his "best guess" that experts
using spectrograms were wrong in about one case out of twenty,
which means that it is a useful-but limited-law enforcement tool.
Ladefoged went on to characterize as "completely irresponsible" the
assertions of witnesses in court that "[t]he voice on the recording is
that of the accused and could be that of no other speaker." '316
While the scholarly community gave the Tosi study mixed
reviews,"' it was good enough to convince some courts that voiceprint
analysis was sufficiently valid for courtroom purposes. The federal
and state law reports contain a number of cases in which voiceprint
analysts were permitted to testify over the objection of the opposing
party, typically for the prosecution in criminal trials."8 Other courts
continued to reject spectrographic evidence. The standard for
admissibility under Frye was acceptance in the scientific community,
and the debate under Frye was often, "whose community?"3"9  In
Tosi's community of supporters, voiceprint analysis was widely
accepted. In the broader community of acoustic phoneticians, it was
not. This difference explains, at least in part, the divergent court
rulings.
Then, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted. Its
standard for admissibility of expert testimony, that the expert "will
assist the trier of fact,""2 would seem to leave more opportunity for a
court to admit spectrographic analysis through experts. In 1979,
however, an influential report by the National Research Council,
usually called the "Bolt Report," questioned the ability of voiceprints
to produce accurate results under forensic conditions with sufficiently
315. PETER LADEFOGED, A COURSE IN PHONETICS 194 (2d ed. 1982).
316. Id.
317. For example, a 1973 letter to the editor of The Journal of the Acoustical Society of
America by prominent critics concluded:
As scientists rather than lawyers, we offer no judgment as to whether or to what
extent speech spectrograms should be used for identification in the courts. We
wish only to point out that present methods for such use lack an adequate
scientific basis for estimating reliability in many practical situations and that
laboratory evaluations of these methods show increasing errors as the conditions
for evaluation move toward real-life situations. We hope that our explanations
of some of the factors that affect speaker identification will provide the legal
profession with helpful information on which to base its own judgments
concerning the admissibility of the spectrographic method.
Richard H. Bolt, Franklin S. Cooper, Edward E. David, Jr. Peter B. Denes, James M.
Pickett & Kenneth N. Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: Some
Further Observations, 54 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'Y AM. 531, 534 (1973).
318. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1975). See FAIGMAN ET
AL., supra note 306, and Rafferty, supra note 306, for lists of cases.
319. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
320. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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low rates of error.321  The report summarized its findings in the
introduction:
The Committee concludes that the technical uncertainties
concerning the present practice of voice identification are so great
as to require that forensic applications be approached with great
caution. The Committee takes no position for or against the
forensic use of the aural-visual method of voice identification, but
recommends that if it is used in testimony, then the limitations of
the method should be clearly and thoroughly explained to the fact
finder, whether judge or jury."'
The Committee later explained:
The degree of accuracy, and the corresponding error rates, of aural-
visual voice identification vary widely from case to case, depending
upon several conditions including the properties of the voices
involved, the conditions under which the voice samples were made,
the characteristics of the equipment used, the skill of the examiner
making the judgments, and the examiner's knowledge about the
case. Estimates of error rates now available pertain to only a few of
the many combinations of conditions in real-life situations. These
estimates do not constitute a generally adequate basis for a judicial
or legislative body to use in making judgments concerning the
reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice identification in
forensic applications.2
It is important to note that the Committee did not dispute Dr.
Tosi's findings. In fact, Tosi was on the Committee.324 Rather, the
report complained that findings supporting the use of voiceprints
were too limited.25  They failed to consider important real-life
variables that would be necessary to draw valid conclusions about
forensic use of voiceprints.326 We make this point not to advocate for
the acceptance of voiceprint analysts in the courts (we do not), but to
point out that the scientific community has generally been
straightforward about the abilities and limitations of voiceprint
analysis.
Subsequently, Dr. Ladefoged reached similar conclusions. A
Hawaii court quoted him as making the following points in 1985:
Dr. Ladefoged proposes the following safeguards: (1) two plus
minutes of each speech sample; (2) a signal to noise ratio where the
signal is higher by 20 decibels; (3) a frequency of 3,000 hertz or
better; (4) an exemplar in the same words, the same rate, in the
same way, spoken naturally and fluently; and (5) a responsible
321. COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, supra note 17. The
chair of this committee was Richard H. Bolt, thus giving the report its name.
322. Id. at 2.
323. Id. at 60.
324. Id. at iii.
325. Id. at 63-64.
326. Id. at 60.
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examiner. Dr. Ladefoged believes there is general acceptance
given his safeguards, and he believes there is now more
327agreement .
3
Rarely will all these safeguards be met, making visual voiceprint
analysis of limited evidentiary value. For this reason, some linguists
continue to express serious doubts about the reliability of this
technology in a forensic setting. Indeed, one phonetician has called it
"a fraud being perpetrated upon the American public and the Courts
of the United States.,
328
Surprisingly enough, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the
published opinions, albeit in smaller numbers overall than before,
continued to be split on the issue. Decisions to admit voiceprint
evidence were reached during that period by the United States Courts
of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, a federal district court
in Hawaii, the supreme courts of Ohio, Maine, and Rhode Island, and
a lower court in New York.329 But during roughly the same time,
voiceprints were held inadmissible by the high courts of Arizona,
Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, and New Jersey. Clearly, the courts
are seriously divided.
This disagreement has not abated, despite significant legal
developments over the past decade. In 1993, the Supreme Court
clarified the standard for admissibility of expert testimony under Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence when it decided Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 ' The issue in Daubert, a products
liability case, was whether Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug taken
during pregnancy, had caused the plaintiff's birth defects. The
epidemiological literature suggested that it did not.33  The plaintiff in
Daubert wanted to call experts who would attack the inferences
drawn from the data in the published literature and bring to bear the
results of animal studies. 33' The trial court had rejected the experts on
the grounds that their work had not been published and therefore
failed to meet the standards of scientific reliability that the courts had
developed under Frye.335 It thus granted summary judgment to the
327. United States v. Maivia, 728 F. Supp. 1471, 1477 (D. Haw. 1990) (citation omitted).
328. HOLLIEN, supra note 179, at 210. For Hollien's more recent assessment, also
negative, see HARRY HOLLIEN, FORENSIC VOICE IDENTIFICATION (2001); FRANCIS
NOLAN, THE PHONETIC BASES OF SPEAKER RECOGNITION 25 (1983).
329. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 306; Rafferty, supra note 306.
330. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 306; Rafferty, supra note 306.
331. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
332. Id. at 582.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 583.
335. Id.
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defendant, Merrell Dow.336 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Rules of
Evidence had replaced the Frye standard.338 It interpreted Rule 702
as requiring courts to engage in a "preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue., 39 To be "scientifically
valid" the proffered evidence need not be uncontroversially accepted
in the scientific community.34 ' Rather, "[t]he adjective 'scientific'
implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. 341
The Court did not attempt to state conditions that are both
necessary and sufficient for evidence to be "scientifically valid., 312 It
did suggest, however, four non-exclusive indicia: whether the theory
offered has been tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review
and publication; the known rate of error; and whether the theory is
generally accepted in the scientific community.43 In a subsequent
case, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the Daubert criteria are to be applied to experts purporting to
testify based on their experience, as well as to experts purporting to
rely on scientific advancements.3" Since then, Rule 702 has been
amended to incorporate these holdings."4  Undeniably, these
principles govern the admissibility of voiceprint testimony.3 6
No federal courts have ruled on the admissibility of voiceprints
since Daubert. However, one state court, the Supreme Court of
Alaska, ruled voiceprint testimony admissible under Daubert in 1999,
while the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
336. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal.
1989).
337. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
338. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
339. Id. at 592-93.
340. Id. at 590.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 594.
343. Id. at 593-94.
344. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999).
345. FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended Dec. 1, 2000). The Rule now permits expert
testimony if "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." Id.
346. There has been a great deal written about the Supreme Court's rulings concerning
the admissibility of expert evidence. For an introduction to the issues, see Margaret A.
Berger, The Supreme Court's Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in FED.




expressed a great deal of skepticism about the technology in 2000. It
is instructive to compare the two cases.
As the Alaskan court noted in State v. Coon, some published
reports support the use of voiceprints in court.3 47  Because the
philosophy of the Federal Rules, under which Daubert was decided, is
to deal with controversy by presenting both sides of an argument
(rather than by excluding evidence altogether), the court placed as
much or more emphasis on studies sponsored by police officials that
advocate for the use of voiceprints as it did on publications from the
independent scientific community.348
Compare Coon to United States v. Drones,349 the Fifth Circuit
habeas corpus case discussed earlier in connection with expert
testimony of aural voice comparison. In that case, a defendant
convicted of drug offenses in Texas argued that his lawyer had not
effectively represented him at trial because he failed to hire a forensic
phonetician to compare the voice on a tape to his voice.35 In support
of his motion, Drones enlisted the help of an expert named Steve
Cain, the voiceprint expert whose testimony was allowed by the
Supreme Court of Alaska in Coon.351 Cain "reached a finding of
'probable elimination,' meaning that at least 80% of the comparable
words in the samples were dissimilar aurally and
spectrographically." '352 In response, the government called Bruce
Koenig, a former FBI employee, who had been one of the early
developers of sound spectrography.353 Koenig testified that "almost
nobody" in the relevant scientific community uses spectrographic
voice identification because there is no theoretical basis for the
proposition that an individual's voice is truly unique and
identifiable.354
In reversing the lower court's granting of the habeas corpus
petition, the appellate court characterized spectrography as "a
dwindling science," not widely accepted in the scientific community.355
It quoted Koenig's testimony to the effect that the number of
practitioners of forensic voiceprint analysis had dwindled from about
347. 974 P.2d 386, 400-01 (Alaska 1999).
348. Id. at 402.
349. United States v. Drones, 218 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000).
350. Id. at 498.
351. Id.; Coon, 974 P.2d at 388.
352. Drones, 218 F.3d at 498-99.
353. Id. at 499.
354. Based on his hearing the voices, however, Koenig agreed with Cain that the voice
on the tape was probably not the defendant's. Id. See discussion supra note 300.
355. Drones, 218 F.3d at 504.
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fifty or sixty to roughly a dozen, as a result of judicial skepticism of
the methodology's scientific basis.356
While the Court mentioned the Alaskan decision in Coon, it left
out the most significant irony: The scientific evidence upon which the
court permitted Cain to testify in Alaska was a 1986 article that
Koenig had published in the FBI Crime Lab Digest.357 In fact, a close
reading of Koenig's article suggests that the Alaska court misstated
Koenig's position. In the article, Koenig indeed said that the rate of
error in the FBI's use of voiceprints was extraordinarily low (0.31%
for false identifications and 0.53% for false eliminations).358 However,
he also said that "meaningful decisions were only made in 34.8% of
the requested comparisons."359 Koenig concluded:
Spectrographic voice comparison is a relatively accurate, but not
positive technique for comparing an unknown voice sample with
known verbatim voice exemplars. Present use of the technique is
limited to a relatively small number of examiners who confront
legal barriers to acceptance, limitations in accuracy and no
universally recognized examiner qualifications and examination
criteria. Its forensic future may shift to testimony where the judge
and jury are advised of the technique's probable accuracy or to
nontestimonial use as an investigative aid for law enforcement.
36
It now appears that just about everyone has jumped ship.
Voiceprint analysis can be reliable in a limited number of cases, but
the scientific community has not adequately established criteria that
define those cases in advance. And the underlying philosophical
question-whether each individual's voice(print) is indeed unique-
has never been answered.
It is true, of course, that voiceprint analysis may well be as
reliable-perhaps even more reliable-than lay witness identification
of voices on tape, the limitations of which we discussed earlier.
Voiceprints might appear useful to bolster an unconvincing aural
identification, or to counter such an identification. The problem with
admitting such evidence is that scientific (or quasi-scientific) jargon
and data tend to have a very strong impact on the jury. In this sense
voiceprint analysis is not unlike the use of lie detectors. Whatever
usefulness they have is generally outweighed by the misleading
impression of infallibility that they convey.
Consequently, we do not currently advocate the use of voiceprint
analysis to identify speakers, although we do not object to
356. Id. at 503-04.
357. Bruce E. Koenig, Spectrographic Voice Identification, 13 CRIME LABORATORY
DIG. 105 (1986).
358. Id. at 115.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 117.
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phoneticians using acoustic information to enhance aural comparison
of voices.361 Forensic phonetics is a vibrant and productive field that
has much to contribute to law enforcement and the judicial process.362
But, as most of the phonetics community recognizes, voiceprint
evidence alone, in which speakers are identified by looking at pictures
of their voice signals, is presently too unreliable to allow people's
freedom to depend on it, at least if not bolstered by considerable
confirming evidence.
In the near future we expect to see improved technology in this
area, including the introduction of forensic applications of automatic
voice recognition devices currently being developed for academic,
commercial, and military purposes.363 A recent article by a group of
researchers from North Carolina reports promising preliminary
results using a computer to generate probability functions based on
ten acoustic features.364  A.P.A. Broeders, a prominent Dutch
researcher, reports a growing use of automatic and semi-automatic
voice recognition technologies by law enforcement agencies around
the world .65 Broeders cautions, however, that considerably more
work must be done to make any of these technologies reliable enough
to meet evidentiary standards.
3
In the meantime, it is of crucial importance that both lay and
expert identification of voices be admitted in court only with
appropriate safeguards. We therefore turn now to some
recommendations for improving the treatment of speaker
identification in the courts.
IV. Recommendations
Having reviewed in detail some of the problems arising from the
present voice identification process in American criminal trials, we
make the following recommendations:
361. See supra note 297.
362. See HOLLIEN, supra note 179 and many other references cited earlier in this
chapter.
363. For a discussion of avenues of research that have yielded impressive results, see
Joseph P. Campbell, Jr., Speaker Recognition: A Tutorial, 85 INST. ELECTRICAL
ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS PROC. 1437 (1997); J.C.L. Ingram et al., Formant Trajectories
as Indices of Phonetic Variation for Speaker Identification, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 129
(1996); Wojciech Majewski & Czeslaw Basztura, Integrated Approach to Speaker
Recognition in Forensic Applications, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 50 (1996).
364. R. Rodman, D. McAllister, D. Bitzer, L. Cepeda & P. Abbitt, Forensic Speaker
Identification Based on Spectral Moments, 9 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 22 (2002).
365. A.P.A. Broeders, Forensic Speech and Audio Analysis: Forensic Linguistics 1998-
2001-A Review 5-6 (Oct. 16-19, 2001) (paper presented at Thirteenth INTERPOL
Forensic Science Symposium, Lyon, France) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
366. Id. at 12-13.
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1. Avoid the Problem of Suggestiveness Altogether
The concern with voice identification that rises to a
constitutional level is the danger that a suggestive procedure before
trial can taint or contaminate the memory of a witness and lead to a
misidentification at trial. Because jurors tend to give great credence
to witnesses who were at the scene, a faulty identification can lead to
a wrongful conviction. This is surely an issue of utmost importance.
The obvious way to avoid the problem is to ensure that if a
witness is to identify the perpetrator at trial, the witness's memory
should not be compromised beforehand. The solution, whenever
feasible, is to present the witness with not just a single voice but with
a voice lineup analogous to a visual lineup. Appropriate procedure
governing eyewitness lineups has received a great deal of attention367
and many of the same considerations apply to voice lineups.36 We
will not detail lineup procedures here. But we do note that the
National Institute of Justice has published a booklet on eyewitness
testimony for law enforcement agencies that proposes procedures
that should be effective for law enforcement without being unduly
suggestive."' We recommend that similar procedures be adopted for
cases involving earwitness identification.
2. Admit Tape Recordings into Evidence Only with Appropriate
Safeguards
With tape-recorded evidence subject to Rule 901, the issue is
somewhat less clear. Nonetheless, several adjustments, some in the
alternative, seem appropriate.
First, the cases contain remarkably little detailed discussion of
what an officer was told when asked to identify a voice on tape.
Courts should start making serious inquiries into suggestiveness when
the authentication of a tape is challenged. Otherwise, no analysis is
possible. In some cases, an officer's identification will be suggestive
367. See, e.g., Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Research on Suggestion in Lineups
and Photospreads, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 13, at 64.
368. For some suggestions, see A.P.A. Broeders, Earwitness Identification: Common
Ground, Disputed Territory and Uncharted Areas, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 3 (1996);
Francis Nolan & Esther Grabe, Preparing a Voice Lineup, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 74
(1996). One way in which eyewitness and voice lineups differ is that by their very nature,
voice lineups can only be presented sequentially. The literature shows that sequential
presentation of photographs in the eyewitness identification context significantly reduces
the rate of false alarms. See, e.g., Nancy Steblay, Jennifer Dysart, Solomon Fulero &
R.C.L. Lindsay, Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup
Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459 (2001).
369. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999).
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because she was presented with a tape recording and asked whether
she can recognize Jones's voice on it. The same problem arises when
the officer is given a transcript with Jones's name on it or is otherwise
informed that Jones's voice is thought to be on the tape. The same
holds true when an officer is presented with a recording of a wiretap
and told that the telephone being tapped belonged to Jones. On the
other hand, if an officer is presented with a tape recording and asked
whether she can identify any of the speakers, the procedure is not
suggestive.
Second, as we pointed out earlier,37 a few courts apply Biggers
analysis to authentications of recorded speech by the police and
virtually always find them not to be suggestive, even when they
obviously are. In these cases, it seems that courts are actually relying
on strong circumstantial evidence of reliability and paying lip service
to the quality of the voice identification. One solution is for courts to
begin taking the problems of voice identification more seriously and
to look carefully for indicia of reliability, even when the identification
is by a police officer and a tape exists. No doubt, courts will find that
the circumstances, taken as a whole, support admitting the tape into
evidence most of the time. But at least the inquiry will be focused on
the relevant issues. Alternatively, courts may wish to apply Biggers
analysis when the defendant has raised a legitimate question about
reliability or when the circumstantial evidence is weak.37' Either
alternative should do more to ensure fairness without unduly
burdening legitimate law enforcement techniques.
Third, when there is no tape, Biggers/Manson must apply. When
a court applies the minimalist approach of Rule 901 without regard to
constitutional safeguards in such cases, it has erred.72
Fourth, we strongly urge that jurors not receive transcripts with
names identifying speakers, unless the issue of identity is conceded or
for some other reason is incontrovertible. Such transcripts should
also not be provided to officers who are asked to identify the voices
on a tape. Transcripts with names are very suggestive and there is no
good reason for their use. Speakers can be identified as speaker A
and speaker B, or by means of some similar system of nomenclature.
We also recommend that transcripts not be admitted into
evidence. Presently there is a split both in the federal circuits and
among state courts on this issue."' It is probably unavoidable that
370. See supra Part I.A.
371. See supra note 118 for a discussion of this alternative.
372. See discussion of United States v. Townsend, No. 97-60491, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
13872, at **29.31 (5th Cir. June 24, 1999), supra note 118.
373. Many jurisdictions allow a transcript to be admitted into evidence and used by the
jury (including the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and several states). 2
CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
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transcripts of tape recordings will be used at trials. In a relatively
literate society such as our own, we tend to place great emphasis on
written words. This is problematic where the underlying event is oral.
There is, first of all, the likelihood that the written transcript is not
accurate in places and is thus subject to the interpretation of the
transcriber. Perhaps more importantly, we tend to ascribe a highly
literal interpretation to written texts.37' For both reasons, courts
should admit only the tape recording itself and make it clear to the
jury that the transcript, if provided at all, is merely an aid to
understanding the tape.375
3. Modify the Biggers Factors in Light of Recent Research into Voice
Identification
When a voice identification is found to be suggestive, courts
apply the Biggers factors to determine whether it is nonetheless
reliable enough to let the issue go to the jury. Recall that Biggers
employed the following criteria:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time
of the crime;
(2) the witness's degree of attention;
(3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation; and
(5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 76
§ 24:7, at 24-22 to 24-23 (2d ed. 1995). On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit and several
other states do not allow the transcript into evidence. Id. at 24-24.
374. Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory
Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431, 449 (2001).
375. For a sample instruction, see Dismuke v. State, 262 S.E.2d 490, 492 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979), where the court instructed the jury as follows:
The court states on the bench that this tape might be difficult for you to
understand. Of course, you are the judges of the evidence in this case, and it is up
to you to determine what if any thing [sic], is said on these tapes. Now, the bailiff
is passing out a transcript that was admittedly made by Mr. Osborne, who is, of
course, a witness for the state. I want to caution you, you may use these
transcripts as you listen to the tapes, so I want to caution you that this transcript
doesn't necessarily mean what that [sic] tapes say. You are able to use that as it
may help you and it may not. It is not evidence of the fact, it is merely Mr.
Osborne's opinion as to what it says. I want to caution you that you must use that
with extreme caution, as far as knowing what the truth or what this tape actually
says. It is up to you, as jurors in this case, to decide what is said by the
conversations on this tape, and to apply them in whatever manner you may seem
[sic] fit in the trial of this case. I just wanted to give you those precautionary
instructions.
While the comment about "extreme caution" may be a bit strong in the average case, in
general we agree with the overall gist of the instruction.
376. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
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Because these factors are oriented toward eyewitness
identification, in earwitness cases courts must adapt them to apply to
speakers. This adaptation is not always straightforward. For
example, the third Biggers criterion, the accuracy of the victim's prior
description of the criminal, will typically have little application in
speaker identification cases. Most people, in our experience, have
fairly limited abilities to describe voices, beyond perhaps commenting
that a voice is high or low, nasal or tinny. Nonetheless, we would not
discard previous identification entirely. It is certainly relevant that a
witness described a voice and then later picked a voice matching that
description. Moreover, a witness may be able to detect a regional
accent, dialectal features, or other nonacoustic information that could
help confirm a later identification. Overall, however, this factor
should receive less weight than it does in eyewitness cases.
Other Biggers factors, such as the witness's degree of attention,
the length of exposure, and the time between the crime and the
confrontation are indeed relevant to reliability. For cases involving
the identification of a voice on tape, the issue would be the time
between the exposure to a person's voice and the identification.
Research also reveals that delay has a very significant impact on
reliability and interacts significantly with the amount of exposure.
Courts should bear in mind that their intuitions about these matters
are not likely to be reliable. Recall the research showing that
accuracy drops significantly after just two or three weeks and can
drop to as low as 13% after a mere five months.
The fourth Biggers factor, the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation, does not correlate all that well with
reliability and should probably not be used as a factor for that reason.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that witnesses tend to vastly
overrate the importance of witness confidence. Nonetheless, we
believe that lack of certainty should be considered. The fact that a
witness is unsure about an identification is probably significant in
most cases.
The Biggers factors are not sufficient in evaluating reliability of
voice identification, however. The research reviewed in this Article
has revealed several other significant factors that should be taken into
account. One is that people are better at identifying the voice of
someone who was previously familiar to them. A second is that the
number of exposures to a voice is at least as important to the length
of exposure in predicting reliable recall. Changes in tone of voice are
also highly significant: A speaker who is under stress or who is very
emotional may speak quite differently from how she normally speaks.
This difference in tone of voice, as we have seen, makes identification
more difficult (and hence, less reliable). The same is true when a
speaker whispers or disguises her voice.
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Other factors are relevant in assessing reliability. People are
better at identifying the voice of someone speaking a language that
they understand, and better yet if the speaker does not have an
accent. 77 Very old and very young people are not as good at speaker
identification. Nonetheless, the empirical results do not seem
sufficiently strong to require that these factors be taken into account
in deciding whether an identification has met due process standards.
Although individual variability may well be an excellent predictor of
reliability, current research does not permit inferences strong enough
to exclude an identification on that basis at this time.
Research into voice identification continues, so this list is
obviously subject to change. We have included only those factors that
seem to us to be relatively well accepted by the academic community.
Application of these factors will, we believe, lead to admission of
more reliable evidence and will consequently reduce the chance of
misidentifications and false convictions.
4. Provide the Jury with Helpful Instructions on How to Assess the
Accuracy of a Voice Identification
Once an earwitness identification is admitted into evidence, the
question goes to the jury. This would be more acceptable if jurors
were given some guidance on how to determine whether a voice
identification is likely to be reliable. Several jurisdictions presently
provide such an instruction in the case of eyewitness identification."'
In contrast, courts seldom, if ever, give such an instruction in a case of
voice identification. In one federal case the trial judge refused to
instruct the jury that the "'value [of the voice identification] depends
upon the opportunity the witness had to hear the offender at the time
of the offense and later make a reliable identification[.]' ' 379 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the refusal, holding that "[a]s long as the
basic requirement of familiarity with the voice is met, lay opinion
testimony is an acceptable means for establishing a speaker's
identity."80 This misses the point. The defendant did not ask that the
jury be instructed to ignore the identification. Rather, the request
was to advise the jurors that they should "value" the identification
only to the extent that they believe it to have been reliable. The
jury's ability to make this evaluation is typically given as the
377. Obviously, having an accent is a relative term. Tiersma believes that he speaks
ordinary American English, but that Solan speaks with a slight New York accent, while
Solan believes that his English is standard and that Tiersma has a slight California accent.
378. See, e.g., California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) No. 2.91 (6th ed. 1996).
379. United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1208 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting the
defendant's submitted jury instruction).
380. Id. (citation omitted).
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justification for having such a low threshold for admissibility.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed a lower court's
refusal to give an instruction on earwitness identification."' The trial
court found that there was "no extensive scientific basis that
'earwitness' identification is as susceptible to the same
misidentification as eyewitness identification. '"38 2 As we have seen,
voice identification is probably even more problematic than
eyewitness testimony. We see no reason for refusing to give an
instruction that could help jurors decide more analytically how much
weight to give an identification.
We recommend that where voice identification evidence has
been admitted, the jury be instructed on how to evaluate that
identification. The court should give the jury concrete guidance not
only on the factors they should consider, but in some cases on how
the factor might influence their decision. Most existing jury
instructions fail to do so. Thus, eyewitness instructions may inform
jurors that race is relevant but will almost never tell them what the
consequence is: that people make less reliable identifications of a
person who differs racially from them. In some cases this may be so
evident as not to need mention. Where it is not intuitively obvious
(as with the impact of a foreign accent), the court should explain its
relevance. Since there are no models for such an instruction, we have
drafted one and include it in the Appendix to this Article.
5. Where Appropriate, Courts Should Allow Expert Witnesses to Testify
on the Reliability of Earwitness Identification
More and more courts have been permitting expert testimony at
trial on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony under appropriate
circumstances. 83  Courts have also been allowing "educational
experts" to point out the shortcomings with other methods of
identification, such as identification by handwriting experts, to
demonstrate the limits of those techniques. We believe that courts
should do the same when it comes to earwitness identifications.
In contrast to jury instructions, which tend to be quite generic,
experts can explain to jurors exactly how research into voice
381. State v. Burnison, 795 P.2d 32, 39-40 (Kan. 1990).
382. Id. at 40. Another reason for refusing the instruction was that the court held the
identification was sufficiently reliable.
383. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). For a recent holding,
see People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 2001). For a discussion of the admissibility of such
expert testimony under various circumstances, see FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 306, § 11-
1.0.
384. For further discussion, see D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are
Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 99, 142
n.171 (2000).
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identification is relevant to the case at hand. Not only might experts
be able to give testimony more attuned to the actual facts, but they
can also bring to bear the most recent research.
To date, the issue has arisen only occasionally, because the
scientific evidence surrounding the identification of speakers has been
largely absent from the legal literature. A Massachusetts court
rejected Professor Yarmey as an expert because the court deemed the
identification in that particular case reliable enough to meet the
concerns that Yarmey would have raised; nevertheless, the court
found that the question of voice identification was in general a proper
subject for expert testimony.385 A federal district court permitted
Professor Hollien to testify about characteristics of a defendant's
voice that might have an impact on a witness's identification.386 While
courts should limit such testimony to ensure that it is tailored to the
issues raised in a particular case, it should certainly not be excluded in
principle.
6. In Cases Involving Recorded Evidence of Speech, Experts Should Be
Allowed to Testify on Their Identification of the Speakers
We remain skeptical of expert testimony based solely on
spectrographic analysis, or voiceprints, largely because it creates the
illusion of being more reliable and accurate than it really is.
Nonetheless, expert testimony can and should sometimes play a role
in identifying speakers. In fact, Professor Hollien has testified in this
capacity in many cases.387
As we mentioned previously, expert voice identification is not
relevant in most earwitness cases, because there will usually have
been no recording of the voice at the scene of the crime. Moreover,
Rule 901 generally does not envision expert voice identification
testimony being necessary to admit a tape recording into evidence. It
does not follow, however, that experts must be excluded at trial when
the defendant has the opportunity to offer a defense. Once a tape is
admitted into evidence, the substantive question of guilt remains to
be determined, and at this point the identification of speakers on the
tape becomes a more serious issue.
In particular, if an officer is asked to identify a voice on a tape
but has no particular personal knowledge about the recording itself
and did not participate in the conversation, that officer's testimony is
no more competent than an expert in phonetics who has studied the
same voice samples. Moreover, as discussed above, experts tend to
385. Commonwealth v. Pagano, 710 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
386. Virgin Islands v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1995).
387. See United States v. Leon, No. 90-6571, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14323, at **5, 10
n.3 (6th Cir. June 12, 1992).
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perform better on voice identification tasks than do non-experts.
When experts testify in such cases, they should be competent in fields
such as acoustics, phonetics, and linguistics.
As Harry Hollien has pointed out, "while there may be no
attribute within a person's speech of sufficient strength and
uniqueness to permit that particular individual to be differentiated
from all other talkers, the use of a group of features may permit
successful recognition."" Research has shown that experts do indeed
perform better than lay people at this task. In appropriate cases, they
should be permitted to testify.
So, was Bruno Hauptmann guilty of kidnapping the Lindbergh
baby? Did Captain Hulet chop off the king's head? We really don't
know, but we do know that Guy Paul Morin was falsely convicted of
raping and murdering a young child. Questions of guilt or innocence
are left to the judge or jury. When the evidence includes the
identification of the defendant's voice, the legal system must take into
account what we have learned over the past half century. Only then
can we ensure that those who claim to have heard voices have
actually heard them.
Appendix
Proposed Jury Instruction on Reliability of Earwitness Identification
Although this instruction is similar to some existing instructions
on eyewitness testimony,389 it differs in two important respects. First,
and rather obviously, it is tailored to the issue of voice identification.
Of course, not all of the questions will be relevant to any specific case.
Those in square brackets are meant to be optional, for instance, and
others may also sometimes be inappropriate.
A witness has identified the voice of the defendant [as being
Speaker A on tape recording Number 1][as being the person who
committed the charged crime]. In deciding whether this identification
was accurate, you should ask yourselves the following questions:
How well could the witness hear the speaker? You should
consider factors like background noise, the distance between the
speaker and the witness, and similar circumstances.
Was the witness paying close attention to the voice?
388. HOLLIEN, supra note 179, at 191.
389. This instruction tracks, to some extent, a proposed instruction on eyewitness
testimony prepared by the California Judicial Council Task Force on Jury Instructions
(Criminal) (on file with Peter Tiersma, who is a member of the Task Force).
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Did the witness ever waver or express uncertainty about the
identification?
Did the witness hear the live voice of the speaker, or was the
voice on tape or on the telephone?
[If the voice was on tape or telephone, what was the quality of
the recording or telephone connection?]
How familiar was the witness with the defendant's voice when
asked to identify it?
[If the witness was not previously familiar with the voice, how
much exposure did the witness have to the voice before being asked
to identify it? On how many occasions was the witness exposed to the
voice? How much time passed between the witness's original
exposure to the voice and being asked to identify it?]
[If the witness gave a description of the speaker's voice, how
similar was that description to the voice of the defendant?]
Was the witness ever asked to identify the speaker before trial?
[If the witness was asked to identify the speaker before trial, how
many voices did the witness have to choose from? Did the witness
ever fail to identify the defendant on these previous occasions? Did
the witness change his or her mind?]
[Did the witness identify the voices of other participants in the
crime? If so, were these identifications accurate?]
[Is the witness experienced at identifying voices, or is there other
evidence that the witness is particularly good at identifying voices?]
Did the speaker have an unusual voice or speech mannerisms
that would make his or her speech easier to identify?
Did the speaker try to disguise his or her voice, or was the
speaker under stress, making identification more difficult?
[Did the speaker have a foreign accent or speak a foreign
language? If so, you should consider that it is often more difficult to
identify someone's voice under these circumstances.]
Was there other evidence, besides the defendant's voice, that
suggested that the defendant was the speaker?
Were there any other circumstances that would have made
identification more or less accurate?
You must consider all the evidence and be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime.
Otherwise, you must find the defendant not guilty.
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